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FAIR USE AVOIDANCE IN MUSIC CASES 
EDWARD LEE* 
Abstract: This Article provides the first empirical study of fair use in cases 
involving musical works. The major finding of the study is surprising: despite 
the relatively high number of music cases decided under the 1976 Copyright 
Act, no decisions have recognized non-parody fair use of a musical work to 
create another musical work, except for a 2017 decision involving the copying 
of a narration that itself contained no music (and therefore might not even 
constitute a musical work). Thus far, no decision has held that copying musi-
cal notes or elements is fair use. Moreover, very few music cases have even 
considered fair use. This Article attempts to explain this fair use avoidance 
and to evaluate its costs and benefits. Whether the lack of a clear precedent 
recognizing music fair use has harmed the creation of music is inconclusive. A 
potential problem of “copyright clutter” may arise, however, from the buildup 
of copyrights to older, unutilized, and underutilized musical works. This copy-
right clutter may subject short combinations of notes contained in older songs 
to copyright assertions, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection 
of laches as a defense to copyright infringement. Such a prospect of copyright 
clutter makes the need for a clear fair use precedent for musical works more 
pressing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Fair use is a common defense in copyright cases involving all sorts of 
works, ranging from literary works, a category that includes computer pro-
grams, to works of visual art.1 The prevalence of fair use defenses comes as 
no surprise given that, unlike many copyright exceptions, the fair use provi-
sion in the 1976 Copyright Act is written as a general, all-purpose exception 
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 1 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2009) (discussing various types of fair uses). 
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with no limitation on the circumstances or the types of copyrighted works 
for which it may be invoked.2 Fair use’s general applicability is buttressed 
by the tendency of courts to devalue the second factor of fair use, the nature 
of the copyrighted work in balancing the four fair use factors.3 As one court 
recognized, “[t]he second factor has rarely played a significant role in the 
determination of a fair use dispute,” a conclusion supported by a compre-
hensive empirical study of fair use.4 The type of copyrighted work, in other 
words, does not appear to play much of a role, if any, in the fair use analy-
sis.  
Or does it? For at least one type of work, namely musical works, fair 
use appears to be far less prevalent. In cases involving musical works that 
allegedly copied portions of other musical works (i.e., specific musical or 
lyrical elements), fair use is dormant and typically not even raised. Consider 
the recent high-profile case involving Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke: 
the duo filed a lawsuit against Marvin Gaye’s estate to establish that their 
mega-hit song “Blurred Lines” did not infringe the copyright to Gaye’s 
1977 song “Got to Give It Up.”5 The case seemed particularly apt for a de-
fense of fair use, given Robin Thicke’s admission in a May 2013 GQ maga-
zine interview that the “groove” of Gaye’s song inspired Pharrell and him to 
create “Blurred Lines” and that they wanted to “make something like that 
[song].”6 Unless one concedes such copying is infringement, this admission 
cries out for a fair use defense. Drawing on parts of a prior work to create a 
new work is a standard ingredient in many fair use defenses that are based 
on so-called transformative uses.7 If the case involved two novels, paint-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an in-
fringement of copyright.”) (emphasis added), with id. § 110(3) (limiting exclusive rights of copy-
holders to permit, among other things, “performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or 
of a dramatico-musical work of a religious nature . . . in the course of services at a place of wor-
ship”). 
 3 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 4.1 (2015)). 
 4 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 610–12 (2008) (suggesting “that the outcome 
of factor two typically has no significant effect on the overall outcome of the fair use test,” but 
also finding greater success of fair use for factual works versus creative works) (emphasis added). 
 5 See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 
885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 6 Stelios Phili, Robin Thicke on That Banned Video, Collaborating with 2 Chainz and Kendrick 
Lamar, and His New Film, GQ (May 6, 2013), http://www.gq.com/story/robin-thicke-interview-
blurred-lines-music-video-collaborating-with-2-chainz-and-kendrick-lamar-mercy [https://perma.
cc/A6BY-4JRV]. 
 7 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267-69 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the importance of transformative use in the context of a parody); see also Samuelson, 
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ings, or even computer programs instead of musical works, fair use would 
be a no-brainer for the defense to raise. But, instead of raising fair use, 
Pharrell and Thicke asserted that they “did not incorporate or otherwise use 
the composition ‘Got to Give It Up’ in ‘Blurred Lines.’”8 Thicke even re-
canted his explanation of composing “Blurred Lines,” instead maintaining 
that he was “high on Vicodin and alcohol” and that Pharrell wrote almost all 
of “Blurred Lines” by himself.9 
In hindsight, Pharrell and Thicke’s failure to raise a fair use defense 
may have been costly, given the jury’s ultimate finding that “Blurred Lines” 
infringed Gaye’s copyright.10 But their strategy in defending against a claim 
of music infringement is no anomaly. Indeed, in practice, it is the rule rather 
than the exception. Except for fair use parody of another song, which is 
well-established under the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 1994 fair use de-
cision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,11 only one federal case has recog-
nized a songwriter’s fair use in copying or borrowing parts of another com-
position. That case, decided in 2017, involved Drake’s sampling of 35 sec-
onds of a sound recording by Jimmy Smith, who narrated his “Jimmy Smith 
Rap” to no music.12 Even this lone fair use precedent in the context of sam-
pling did not address the fair use factors applied to musical notes, as op-
posed to words. Moreover, it is debatable whether “Jimmy Smith Rap” even 
constitutes a musical work, although the district court apparently assumed 
without deciding that it was based on the plaintiffs’ characterization.13 The 
Copyright Office allowed a registration for “Jimmy Smith Rap” apparently 
as a musical work,14 but that classification is contrary to the Copyright Of-
fice’s own definition of musical work, which requires music to be a part of 
the work.15 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 1, at 2553 (noting that in addition to criticism, authors also sometimes borrow from 
existing works as an exercise in transformative artistic expression). 
 8 Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-
06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 13648068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Pharrell Wil-
liams Complaint]. 
 9 August Brown, Robin Thicke on ‘Blurred Lines’: ‘I Was High on Vicodin and Alcohol,’ L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/posts/la-et-ms-robin-thicke-
blurred-lines-deposition-high-vicodin-alcohol-20140915-story.html [https://perma.cc/LY8A-FCXG]. 
 10 See Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *47. 
 11 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 12 Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 742–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 13 Id. at 745 (describing the “composition copyright” to “Jimmy Smith Rap” asserted by 
plaintiffs, but finding a genuine issue of fact as to the authorship of the work). 
 14 Id. at 744. 
 15 See United States Copyright Office, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 
§ 802.1 (3d ed. 2017) (“For purposes of copyright registration, musical works (which are also 
known as musical compositions) are original works of authorship consisting of music and any 
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The dearth of music fair use is puzzling, especially given the relatively 
high number of music cases litigated over several decades and the ease of 
raising a fair use defense. Unlike pantomimes and choreographic works, 
which have not been the subject of many copyright lawsuits, there are at 
least four musical work copyright decisions per year on average.16 Never-
theless, musicians accused of infringement, such as Pharrell and Thicke, 
typically avoid pursuing fair use defenses to a decision—a pattern that has 
persisted from the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act to this day. Even 
when fair use is included as part of a defendant’s answer to a claim of in-
fringement of a musical work copyright, fair use is not often litigated. For 
example, in her case over her allegedly infringing song “Vogue,” Madonna 
prevailed on a defense of de minimis copying instead of litigating her fair 
use defense raised in her answer.17 Similarly, Led Zeppelin succeeded in 
arguing that its song “Stairway to Heaven” did not infringe the band Spirit’s 
song “Taurus,” but Led Zeppelin did not press the fair use defense included 
in its answer.18  
This avoidance of fair use is especially puzzling given how music is 
composed of discrete, identifiable combinations of notes, much in the way 
that literary works contain words that may be quoted for fair use.19 Of 
course, fair use is sometimes derided by critics as typically a defense of last 
resort or a losing argument.20 But that view proves too much, as the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have considered fair use defenses of consid-
erable force and merit, including in the context of parody fair use of musical 
works.21 The absence of non-parody fair use cases involving musical works 
thus cannot be explained by the putative lack of merit of the defense. 
                                                                                                                           
accompanying words. Music is a succession of pitches or rhythms, or both, usually in some defi-
nite pattern.”). The Copyright Act does not define “musical work.”  
 16 See infra notes 147–148 and accompanying text; see also Music Copyright Infringement Re-
source: Case List, USC GOULD SCH. L., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Pages/ [https://perma.cc/2VGV-
XKZP] (setting out a comprehensive list of music disputes heard in federal court since 1844). 
 17 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877–80 (9th Cir. 2016); Answer of De-
fendants Madonna Louise Ciccone and Webo Girl Publishing, Inc. to the Complaint at 5, VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-5967-SVW(FMOx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013). 
 18 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-03462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 6674985, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016); Answer of Defendants James Patrick Page, Robert Anthony Plant and 
John Paul Jones at 28, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15-cv-03462 RGK (AGR) (C.D. Cal. 
2016 May 20, 2015). 
 19 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1985) 
(discussing fair use for quotations in the context of literary works). 
 20 See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 605 (2001). 
 21 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (finding that parody is clearly fair use). 
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This Article examines and attempts to explain this anomaly.22 Part I 
explains why fair use, operating as a safety valve, would help spur the crea-
tion of music.23 Part II summarizes a novel empirical study of music in-
fringement cases that indicates that (i) no composer or songwriter has ever 
prevailed in establishing a non-parody fair use of musical notes in another 
musical work under the 1976 Copyright Act, and only one recent case has 
recognized non-parody fair use of spoken words in a putative musical work 
(because the narration or rap had no accompanying music, it arguably does 
not even constitute a musical work); and (ii) the defense of fair use is sel-
dom even pursued or resolved in music cases.24 Part III posits a new theory 
of “fair use avoidance” to explain this anomaly and describes the various 
reasons why both musicians and courts may be avoiding the defense of fair 
use in infringement cases involving two competing musical works.25 Part IV 
then evaluates whether fair use avoidance is desirable for creativity in mu-
sic and the copyright system as a whole.26 One concern is that a recent Su-
preme Court decision barring the use of laches in copyright cases may cre-
ate a potential problem of “copyright clutter” over musical notes contained 
in older songs, a problem that may create a greater need for a clear prece-
dent recognizing non-parody fair use in music cases.27 
I. FAIR USE’S RELEVANCE TO MUSIC COMPOSITION 
Part I discusses why fair use should, in theory, be helpful to songwriters 
and composers of music.28 Given the pervasiveness of borrowing in music 
compositions, plus the limited number of notes, chords, and progressions, fair 
use appears to present a much-needed safeguard for facilitating the creation 
of new musical works as it commonly does with other types of works.29 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 23–313 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 28–138 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 139–163 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 164–252 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 253–313 and accompanying text. 
 27 Petrella v. Metro-Goldywn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1972–77 (2014); see also infra notes 
306–311 and accompanying text.  
 28 See infra notes 107–138 and accompanying text. 
 29 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (discussing how fair use is an 
example of the “speech-protective . . . safeguards” built in to copyright law). 
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A. Fair Use and the “Borrowing” of Copyrighted Content 
1. Transformative Works 
The starting point of fair use is that the defendant used someone else’s 
copyrighted content without permission.30 In other words, the defendant 
copied a work either in whole or in part. What separates fair use from in-
fringement is hard to define, given the case-by-case nature of fair use.31 At 
the outset, though, it is important to understand why fair use should be rele-
vant to music composition, given how fair use operates in copyright law in 
facilitating the creation of transformative works. 
In considering fair use, courts balance the four factors set forth in sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act to determine if the defendant’s unauthorized 
use of the copyrighted content is a fair use.32 Since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Campbell, courts often focus their analysis on the first factor of 
fair use, namely, the purpose and character of the defendant’s use of the 
copyrighted content, and specifically whether such use is “transformative,” 
i.e., whether the defendant’s use of the work “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”33 As the Court explained in Campbell: 
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for 
a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and 
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and 
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.34 
Thus, we might characterize such transformative uses as occupying the 
“heartland” of fair use: the defendant has copied a copyrighted work only to 
                                                                                                                           
 30 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 31 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (noting that because the statute defining fair use calls for a 
case-by-case approach, the task of evaluating a given fair use cannot be reduced to simple bright-
line rules). 
 32 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Perhaps Lloyd Weinreb encapsulated fair use the best when he stated 
that “fair use has historically been and ought to remain what its name suggests: an exemption from 
copyright infringement for uses that are fair.” Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990). Of course, fair use is often justified as 
serving utilitarian goals to spur criticism, the creation of new works, and other purposes. See 
Frank P. Darr, Testing an Economic Theory of Copyright: Historical Materials and Fair Use, 32 
B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1028–30 (1991). 
 33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 34 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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create a new work, one that alters the first work in a way that is transforma-
tive in expression, meaning, or message.35 In this heartland, fair use facili-
tates the creation of new works, consistent with the overall goal of the Cop-
yright Clause in the U.S. Constitution, “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”36 
The Supreme Court calls these new works that are based on fair uses 
“transformative works.” In Campbell, the transformative work was a new 
song that parodied an old song, “Oh, Pretty Woman.”37 Except for one line, 
the lyrics in the parody were different and the music of the parody was rem-
iniscent of the old song but added jarring, hip-hop elements to it, making 
the sounds of the music different from the original.38 As the facts in Camp-
bell show, a basic fact pattern is common to these heartland fair use cases 
where the creation of a new transformative work is involved: (1) a defend-
ant copies a portion of an existing work without permission (i.e., copying) 
but (2) alters the copied work by adding new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage (i.e., to create something new).39 In short, a transformative work in-
volves the defendant copying parts of an existing work to create a new 
work. 
The category of transformative works sounds easy to define. But one 
difficulty with the category is its elusive relationship with derivative works, 
which are defined to include “any . . . form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted.”40 Because applying fair use to musical composi-
tions that borrow from prior works raises this very issue, it is worth analyz-
ing the complexity of the problem. 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) 
(“If . . . the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrich-
ment of society.”). 
 36 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 37 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. Recognizing the value of a fair use defense, the Campbell Court 
noted that “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyright-
ed materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.’” Id. at 575. 
 38 See id. at 582. Some fair uses do not involve the creation of new transformative works at 
all, but instead transformative purposes in utilizing existing works, such as in Authors Guild that 
involved verbatim copies of works for use in a search database to identify the works by content. 
See, e.g., Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 216–20. As discussed in Part III, courts have not fully ad-
dressed the complexities between transformative character and transformative purpose—which, in 
turn, may be a reason why courts have shied away from fair use in deciding music cases. See infra 
notes 241–252 and accompanying text. 
 39 See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (discussing fair use in the context of a modern rap 
parody of a popular 1960s song). 
 40 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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When a copyrighted work is used in a way that recasts, transforms, or 
adapts the work into a new work, the new work is considered a derivative 
work that falls within the existing copyright.41 Similar to transformative 
works under fair use, a derivative work contains a portion of an existing 
work and at least some element that is different from the existing work, 
such as a change in medium or format (for example, a toy or sculpture made 
from a fictional character) or a new story or sequel involving existing char-
acters. The Copyright Act gives several examples of derivative works: “a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, [and] con-
densation.”42 An unauthorized derivative work would be infringing, but an 
unauthorized transformative work could be a fair use. So how is transform-
ing a work into a derivative work different from using a work to create a 
transformative work under fair use? 
This is a thorny question. As Part III, infra, suggests, the courts’ collec-
tive ambivalence in resolving this question may be one reason why courts 
have shied away from the fair use doctrine in deciding music cases.43 Thus 
far, courts have treated “transform” under derivative works and “transform-
ative works” under fair use as separate, seemingly unrelated inquiries.44 Ac-
cording to a survey of fair use decisions up to 2008 addressing “transforma-
tive” use, “courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the de-
fendant’s purpose in using the underlying work, rather than any transfor-
mation (or lack thereof) by the defendant of the content of the underlying 
work.”45 For example, in 2015, in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained the difference be-
tween fair uses and derivative works by focusing on the purpose of use: 
The statute defines derivative works largely by example, rather 
than explanation . . . . As we noted in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Ha-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright transform an original work 
into a new mode of presentation, such works—unlike works of fair use—take expression for pur-
poses that are not ‘transformative.’”). 
 45 R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 467, 485 (2008); see also Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory 
Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use 
Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260, 273–92 (2012) (concluding, on the basis of a survey of 
federal appellate decisions, that with respect to the transformative factor of the test, the courts 
focus on transformative purpose because each and every approved fair use involved a change in 
the predominant purpose for the use of the work and not simply a change in the character (the 
form or contents) of the work). 
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thiTrust, “[p]aradigmatic examples of derivative works include 
the translation of a novel into another language, the adaptation of 
a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-
book or an audiobook.” While such changes can be described as 
transformations, they do not involve the kind of transformative 
purpose that favors a fair use finding. The statutory definition 
suggests that derivative works generally involve transformations 
in the nature of changes of form. By contrast, copying from an 
original for the purpose of criticism or commentary on the origi-
nal or provision of information about it, tends most clearly to sat-
isfy Campbell’s notion of the “transformative” purpose involved 
in the analysis of Factor One.46 
Tony Reese, writing before the Authors Guild decision, questions 
whether focusing exclusively on purpose in the transformativeness inquiry 
makes complete sense: “Transformativeness obviously could involve the 
extent to which the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work has been 
transformed or altered. Campbell itself involved a defendant’s use that had 
altered the plaintiff’s copyrighted original work by changing much of both 
the lyrics and the music of the song.”47 
 Indeed, a close reading of Campbell supports this view. The Campbell 
Court explained the concept of transformative use as follows: the use “in-
stead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”48 Purpose is 
one of the ways in which the Court recognizes that a use of a work can add 
something new, but another way is by giving a different character to the 
work, which tracks the language of the first factor in the fair use provi-
sion.49 Character is different than purpose and relates to the actual composi-
tion or content of the use of a work.50 It would be odd and against an ac-
cepted canon of construction for the Court to use both terms “further pur-
pose” or “different character” and reduce one to mere surplusage.51  
This understanding of transformative also is consistent with Judge 
Pierre Leval’s first elaboration of the concept in his Harvard Law Review 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 215–16 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 47 Reese, supra note 45, at 485 (emphasis added). 
 48 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). 
 49 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 50 See Character, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/character [https://perma.cc/KV6G-D3BC] (defining character as “the aggregate of 
distinctive qualities characteristic of a breed, strain, or type”). 
 51 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (noting that it is the Court’s duty “to give 
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 
U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)). 
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article upon which the Campbell Court relied (although, as discussed above, 
Judge Leval’s discussion of transformative in Authors Guild focused on 
purpose of use).52 Leval explained transformative as follows: “The use must 
be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or 
for a different purpose from the original.”53 Presumably, the manner in 
which a work is used could involve use of the work, for example, “as raw 
material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.”54 Such uses go beyond mere purpose, 
they involve additions or changes to the underlying content or raw material, 
producing “new aesthetics” in some instances.55 The copied portion is not 
“merely repackage[d] or republishe[d],” but rather it is “transformed in the 
creation of [something] new.”56 
This second kind of transformative use—focusing on the content of the 
use instead of the purpose of use—was analyzed in Cariou v. Prince, a 2013 
Second Circuit decision that came out before the Authors Guild decision.57 
In finding most of the contested works of Richard Prince’s appropriation art 
(consisting largely of his unauthorized copies of copyrighted photographs 
taken by others) to be fair uses, the Second Circuit focused on the content 
of Prince’s art, which juxtaposed images of Rastafarians, especially their 
faces (though, with some color splotches he added), with images of partially 
naked women.58 The court explained: “[T]o qualify as a fair use, a new 
work generally must alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or 
message.’”59 Applying this approach, the court readily found that Prince had 
made transformative uses of the photographs based on the content of 
Prince’s creations: “Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, 
and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the [original] 
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.”60 The court em-
phasized that Prince’s use transformed the content or character of the pho-
tographs, not the purpose of use, in finding fair use: “[L]ooking at the art-
works and the photographs side-by-side, we conclude that Prince’s images 
. . . have a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Leval, supra note 35, at 1111. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 58 See id. at 705–12. 
 59 Id. at 706. 
 60 Id. (emphasis added). 
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and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct 
from Cariou’s.”61 
As far as the purpose of Prince’s use goes, the court discounted 
Prince’s deposition testimony “that he was not ‘trying to create anything 
with a new meaning or a new message.’”62 The court expressed skepticism 
about a defendant’s ability to give non-self-serving testimony about his 
transformative purpose to support a fair use claim.63 The defendant’s sub-
jective intent did not matter much, if at all.64 Instead, “[w]hat is critical is 
how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply 
what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work.”65 The 
Second Circuit focused on content, the end product of the defendant’s use.66 
Thus, the Second Circuit’s treatment of transformative fair use pre-
sents an ambivalent view. Authors Guild focused on purpose of use, in part, 
because the defendant’s use did not involve a transformation of the underly-
ing content that it copied for use in its search database.67 By contrast, the 
Prince case focused on character of use.68 Courts have predominantly fo-
cused on purpose of use.69 But the Prince case illuminates how the charac-
ter of use may also be pivotal in determining fair use.70 
Professor Reese provides a helpful typology of how “transformative” 
might be categorized in terms of purpose and content.71 I have recast the 
typology in Table 1 below.72 








1 Yes Yes Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
2 Yes No Cariou v. Prince 
3 No Yes Authors Guild 
4 No No Likely no fair use 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 707–08. (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. at 707. 
 63 Id. (“It is not surprising that, when transformative use is at issue, the alleged infringer 
would go to great lengths to explain and defend his use as transformative.”). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. (“The focus of our infringement analysis is primarily on the Prince artworks themselves 
. . . .”). 
 67 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 208–10. 
 68 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705–12. 
 69 Reese, supra note 45, at 485. 
 70 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705–12. 
 71 Reese, supra note 45, at 486. 
 72 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/lee-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/D876-7ZVU]. 
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The easier cases to decide are ones in which both content and purpose 
are transformative (first type) or not transformative (fourth type), i.e. “dou-
ble or nothing” transformativeness.73 Courts have recognized fair uses for 
the first type (although often emphasizing the transformative purpose) and 
have typically rejected fair uses for the fourth type.74 The more difficult 
cases tend to be the ones in which there is transformativeness either in con-
tent or purpose (second and third types), but not in both.  
Authors Guild is an example of a case with a transformative purpose, 
but without alteration of the content, which Google copied verbatim.75 By 
contrast, the Prince case seems more aptly categorized as the second type 
because the Second Circuit found that Prince had transformed the content of 
the underlying photographs, but the court stopped short of identifying a 
specific transformative purpose in Prince’s work.76 Moreover, one could 
argue that photographs have the same general purpose of visual depiction or 
representation of whatever they capture, which would be the same general 
purpose of Prince’s artwork. 
Because fair use must be decided on a case-by-case basis, these catego-
ries do not present hard-and-fast rules. But they are helpful in understanding 
how courts have analyzed fair use in terms of transformativeness.77 We will 
return to them in Part III when we consider potential reasons why courts have 
not considered non-parody fair use of musical works.78 For now, it suffices to 
understand that musical works that borrow from other musical works might 
fall within the first or second type of transformative uses. 
2. Examples of Transformative Works 
Transformative works can be further categorized depending on whether 
the new work is in the same category of work as the work that it copies. As 
explained below, some transformative works draw from different types of 
works, while other transformative works draw from works of the same type. 
For our purposes, the latter category of transformative work is more relevant, 
but both categories are explained in the sections below. The point of this dis-
cussion is not to suggest that whether the two works in a copyright dispute are 
of the same or different type affects the fair use analysis, though perhaps in 
some cases, it may. Instead, the ensuing discussion is intended to highlight 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Reese, supra note 45, at 486. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202 (discussing fair use in the context of Google’s 
copying and providing online access to millions of copyrighted books). 
 76 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
 77 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 78 See infra notes 220–252 and accompanying text. 
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how the two categories of transformative works might illuminate which in-
dustries or creative activities may depend on fair use. The music cases ana-
lyzed in the survey in Part II fall within the same-type category. 
a. Fair Use of a Different Type of Work 
The first category of transformative work involves a fair use of a por-
tion of one type of work to create a new work of a different type. I will call 
these works “different-type” transformative works. For example, in 2000, in 
Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp., a newspaper’s copying of a 
photograph, a pictorial work, for reporting of a controversy in the newspa-
per, primarily a literary work, was deemed to be a transformative fair use by 
the First Circuit.79 A similar use was recognized as transformative in the 
Second Circuit’s 2006 decision in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kinders-
ley Ltd., where a book about the Grateful Dead copied the band’s various 
concert posters (pictorial works) for historical reference.80 Of course, not 
every defense of fair use is successful. A trivia book (a literary work) of the 
TV show Seinfeld (an audiovisual work and/or a dramatic work) was found 
not to be a fair use of the show.81 
b. Fair Use of the Same Type of Work 
The second category of transformative work involves a fair use of a 
portion of one type of work to create a new work of the same type. These 
“same-type” transformative works involve at least two works of the same 
kind. The music cases studied in this Article fall within this category. Be-
fore discussing the music cases, this section discusses some common exam-
ples of fair use related to same-type transformative works.82  
i. Quotation of Literary Works 
A paradigmatic example of this kind of transformative work, where one 
work borrows from the same type of work, is a book review. A book review 
often quotes portions of a copyrighted book, but in the context of the review-
er’s own critique of the book. As Justice Story said in the Circuit Court of 
Massachusetts’ seminal fair use opinion in 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh: 
[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his 
design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 80 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 81 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d at 141. 
 82 See infra notes 83–106 and accompanying text. 
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fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if 
he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, not 
to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and sub-
stitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.83 
Of course, one could write a book review without quoting parts of the book. 
But the review probably would be more convincing if it supported its analy-
sis with some quotations. For example, let’s say the review praises the poet-
ic language of a book. Quotation of a sentence or two to substantiate such 
praise would make the review more persuasive. And requiring a copyright 
license for such quotation would potentially stifle criticisms of a book be-
cause the author could just refuse to license, particularly if the requested 
license is for a negative review.84 
Justice Story’s example explains a crucial difference between quoting 
a work to critique it and quoting a work to be a substitute for the work.85 In 
the Supreme Court’s 1990 case, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises, the Nation Magazine quoted key passages of an unpublished memoir 
by President Ford, thus “scooping” and substituting for the book.86 One 
could read the magazine article and get the juiciest parts of the memoir, all 
without reading the book. The Court easily found no fair use.87 
In sum, the use of quotations of literary works for criticism or com-
ment are paradigmatic examples of same-type transformative works. If the 
quotations were “for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism,” they are 
treated as fair uses unless too much was copied.88 Quotation shows how fair 
use can facilitate the creation of same-type transformative works. The con-
cept of quotation originated with text, but it is possible to use the term for 
visual works89 and music,90 as discussed below. 
ii. Copying to Create Appropriation Art 
Pictorial works are another type of work that lends itself to the same-
type category of transformative works. Indeed, history is replete with exam-
ples of painters and other pictorial artists (1) copying elements of other picto-
rial works but (2) adding new expression to them in creating their own works. 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 84 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting the harm that 
would result for book reviews generally if quotations were deemed to be copyright infringement). 
 85 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344–45. 
 86 Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 562. 
 87 Id. at 569. 
 88 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 344–45. 
 89 See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 107–138 and accompanying text. 
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Picasso was (in)famous for borrowing from the works of other artists, 
including Delacroix, Velazquez, Manet, Matisse, African artists, and oth-
ers.91 Throughout history, some of our greatest artists drew inspiration, ide-
as, and even expression from prior works and the works of their contempo-
rary rivals in creating their own paintings.92 Today, “appropriation art” has 
become a recognized art form. Andy Warhol, Sherrie Levine, Jeff Koons, 
Robert Rauschenberg, Richard Prince, and other appropriation artists have 
pushed the boundaries of creating art sometimes by copying the entirety of 
other works.93 Several lawsuits have been brought against Koons and 
Prince, who both raised fair use defenses. In some cases, fair use was suc-
cessful.94 In other cases, the defense failed.95 
Even when the appropriation artist copies the entirety of another work, 
such as by photographing a photograph, the copying or appropriation is de-
fended as an act of criticism, subversion, or transformation. As one commen-
tator explains, “[t]he artist removed the original work from its original con-
text and by doing so tries to force the viewer to see the image differently; they 
transformed the original work.”96 Moreover, “in the process of creating ap-
propriation art, which uses another’s work as a keystone, the appropriation 
artist challenges ‘ideas about ownership and originality.’”97 Originality, a 
basic requirement for copyrighted works, itself is the subject of the appropria-
tion artist’s critique. Copyright law, however, has taken an ambivalent stance 
to appropriation art, with a mixed result under fair use. Nevertheless, the Car-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: BEYOND THE MYTH OF GENIUS 199–209 (1993); 
Timothy Anglin Burgard, Picasso and Appropriation, 73 ART BULL. 479, 479 (1991); Rachel 
Isabelle Butt, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1055, 1060 
(2010); Stephen Bevan, Picasso ‘Stole the Work of African Artists,’ TELEGRAPH (Mar. 12, 2006), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/1512804/Picasso-
stole-the-work-of-African-artists.html [https://perma.cc/TWL8-V5HH]; Andrew Meldrum, Steal-
ing Beauty, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/mar/15/
art [https://perma.cc/F4D3-4J83]. 
 92 See generally SEBASTIAN SMEE, THE ART OF RIVALRY: FOUR FRIENDSHIPS, BETRAYALS, 
AND BREAKTHROUGHS IN MODERN ART (2016) (describing the fierce competition between four 
pairs of famous artists that drove each to new heights). 
 93 See Jason D. Sanders, Appropriating Artists Face Uncertainty in Interplay Between First 
Sale and Fair Use Doctrines, N.Y. ST. B.J., July–Aug. 2005, at 18–19. 
 94 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 (court finding Prince’s artworks were fair use of Cariou’s photo-
graphs); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (court finding Koons’ use of “Silk 
Sandals” to be fair use and therefore non-infringing). 
 95 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310–12 (2d Cir. 1992) (court rejecting fair use after 
finding each of the statutory four factors militated against it); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 
6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (court finding Koons liable for 
copyright infringement based on Koons’ copying of Campbell’s photograph). 
 96 Butt, supra note 91, at 1061. 
 97 Id. at 1062. 
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iou decision recognizes that some works of appropriation art are fair uses as 
transformative works (here, same-type transformative works).98 
iii. Copying to Create Computer Programs 
One final type of work is worth considering before examining musical 
works. Computer programs, which are classified as literary works under the 
Copyright Act, are also the subject of fair use in the creation of other com-
puter programs.99 Courts have recognized a fair use in the making of “in-
termediate copies” of a computer program to identify the unprotected func-
tional elements to make a new program that is interoperable with an operat-
ing system, where the new program did not incorporate any copyrighted 
element of the first program.100 The recent controversy between Oracle and 
Google involved a new program created by Google for its Android phone 
that incorporates some of Oracle’s copyrighted Java program (i.e., declara-
tions and the structure, sequence, and organization or SSO of Oracle’s Java 
program) to create a new program for Google’s Android phone.101 A jury 
found that such copying of Java by Google was a fair use.102 On appeal, 
however, the Federal Circuit overturned the jury verdict and ruled that 
Google’s copying of Java to create the Android program was not transform-
ative or fair use as a matter of law.103 The Federal Circuit appeared to take a 
dim view that same-type works can constitute fair use without a showing of 
a different purpose: “Where the use ‘is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (finding twenty-five of Prince’s artworks transformative in 
nature and therefore fair uses). 
 99 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 100 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We 
conclude that where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional ele-
ments embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for 
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.”). 
 101 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016), rev’d 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC (Oracle II), 886 F.3d 1179, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting 
that Google and Oracle differ in their conclusions as to whether a reasonable jury could find trans-
formative use). Compare Opening Brief and Addendum for Oracle Am., Inc. at 32, Oracle II, 886 
F.3d 1179 (Nos. 17-1118, 17-1202), 2017 WL 679347, at *32 (arguing that Google’s program was 
not transformative owing to the fact that it used the same expression to achieve the same purpose, 
despite doing so in a different medium), with Brief of Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Google 
Inc. at 28, Oracle II, 886 F.3d 1179 (Nos. 17-1118, 17-1202), 2017 WL 2305681, at *28 (arguing 
that Google’s use was transformative because “it integrated selected elements, namely declarations 
from 37 packages to interface with all new implementing code optimized for mobile smartphones 
and added entirely new Java packages written by Google itself, which enabled a purpose distinct 
from the desktop purpose of the copyrighted works”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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copyright holder’s] . . . such use seriously weakens a claimed fair use.’”104 
In Google’s case, the court concluded that “[t]he fact that Google created 
exact copies of the declaring code and SSO and used those copies for the 
same purpose as the original material ‘seriously weakens [the] claimed fair 
use.’”105 Although the Federal Circuit also recognized the possibility that 
copying computer code into a new context could create new expression that 
is transformative, the court rejected Google’s argument of a new context for 
smartphones because Oracle had already licensed its Java code for use in 
smartphones of Danger and Nokia.106 
B. Borrowing in Music Composition 
Now that we have a basic understanding of how fair use facilitates the 
creation of transformative works, we can turn to the main subject of this Arti-
cle: musical works. Similar to literary and pictorial works, musical works 
sometimes, if not often, involve a composer’s copying—or “borrowing”—
elements from other musical works to create a new work. Borrowing may 
consist of a range of copying, including “transcription, variations, quotation, 
paraphrase, parody, modeling, allusion, sampling, and many other ways to 
rework existing music, from troping and organum to collage and electronic 
manipulation.”107 This Article focuses on a composer’s borrowing of an ele-
ment of a musical work to use in the creation of a new work. To the extent a 
musical work borrows or copies elements of a prior musical work to create a 
new work, it fits within the pattern for a transformative work. 
1. Musicians Have Borrowed Throughout History 
Musical works are amenable to fair use given the long history of bor-
rowing in music dating at least back to seventeenth century classical music108 
and extending to today’s music.109 Musicologists have documented the perva-
sive borrowing of prior music by even the most famous composers, including 
Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Handel, Mozart, Rachmaninoff, and Wagner, to 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Oracle II, 886 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 105 Id. at 1200. 
 106 Id. at 1201–02. 
 107 Musical Borrowing & Reworking, IND. UNIV. JACOBS SCH. MUSIC CTR. FOR HIST. MUSIC 
THEORY & LITERATURE, http://chmtl.indiana.edu/borrowing/ [https://perma.cc/XW7K-7H6P]. 
 108 See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case of Rethinking Music Copyright Protec-
tion, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 426–30 (2004). 
 109 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and 
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 615–18 (2006); Keyes, supra note 108, at 426–30. 
2018] Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases 1891 
name a few.110 The extent of borrowing in music is so large that it has 
spawned an entire field of research among musicologists and other scholars, 
who have produced an extensive body of scholarship analyzing the phenome-
non of music borrowing.111 In the law academy, Olufunmilayo Arewa’s 
scholarship has chronicled musical borrowing in a variety of genres.112 
Borrowing aspects of prior works in composing new music was not 
limited to classical music. Early to modern American music, including co-
lonial music, the works of Aaron Copeland and George Gershwin, jazz, pop, 
rock and roll, and hip-hop have all routinely involved some form of borrow-
ing of prior works.113 As one commentator aptly put it, “[m]usical stealing is 
probably as old as music . . . . No one, in this advanced age, is particularly 
horrified when he encounters it, and no one expects musical composition to 
continue without it.”114 Indeed, many popular songs in the U.S. have con-
tained apparent borrowing of elements of prior musical works, as summa-
rized in Table 2 below:115 
  
                                                                                                                           
 110 See J. Peter Burkholder, The Uses of Existing Music: Musical Borrowing as a Field, 50 
NOTES 851, 851 (1994); E. DeMatt Henderson, The Law of Copyright Especially Musical, 1 COP-
YRIGHT L. SYMP. 125, 150 (1938); Keyes, supra note 108, at 427; see also ALFRED M. SHAFTER, 
MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 187 (1932). 
 111 See Musical Borrowing & Reworking, supra note 107; supra note 110. 
 112 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copy-
right, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573 (2010); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish 
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 113 See Arewa, supra note 109, at 612–19; Keyes, supra note 108, at 427–30. 
 114 SHAFTER, supra note 110, at 148–49. 
 115 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/lee-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/D876-7ZVU]. 
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Table 2. Examples of Apparent Borrowing in Popular Musical Works 
Borrowing Song From Prior Song 
The Beach Boys, “Surfin’ U.S.A.” (1963) Chuck Berry, “Sweet Little Sixteen” (1958) 
The Doors, “Hello, I Love You” (1968) The Kinks, “All Day and All of the Night” 
(1964) 
Led Zeppelin, “Whole Lotta Love” (1969) Willie Dixon (performed by Muddy Wa-
ters), “You Need Love” (1962) 
Led Zeppelin, “Bring It On Home” (1969) Willie Dixon (performed by Sonny Boy 
Williamson), “Bring It On Home” (1966) 
George Harrison, “My Sweet Lord” 
(1970) 
Ronald Mack (performed by the Chiffons), 
“He’s So Fine” (1962) 
Ray Parker, “Ghostbusters” (1984) Huey Lewis and the News, “I Want a New 
Drug” (1984) 
Metallica, “Master of Puppets” (1986) David Bowie, “Andy Warhol” (1971) 
Ice-T, “6 ’N the Mornin’” (1986) Schoolly D, “P.S.K. What Does it Mean” 
(1985) 
Nirvana, “Come as You Are” (1991) Killing Joke, “Eighties” (1985) 
Green Day, “Warning” (2000) and Other 
Garden, “Never Got the Chance” (1992) 
The Kinks, “Picture Book” (1968) 
Coldplay, “Shiver” (2000)  Jeff Buckley, “So Real” (1994) 
The Strokes, “Last Nite” (2001) Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers, “Ameri-
can Girl” (1977) 
Coldplay, “God Put A Smile Upon Your 
Face” (2002)  
Radiohead, “2+2=5” (2003) 
Red Hot Chili Peppers, “Dani California” 
(2006) 
Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers, “Mary 
Jane’s Last Dance” (1993) 
Coldplay, “Vida La Vida” (2008) Joe Satriani, “If I Could Fly” (2004) 
Lady Gaga, “Born This Way” (2011) Madonna, “Express Yourself” (1989) 
Pharrell, Robin Thicke, “Blurred Lines” 
(2014) 
Marvin Gaye, “Got to Give It Up” (1977) 
Green Day, “Warning” (2000) and Other 
Garden, “Never Got the Chance” (1992) 
The Kinks, “Picture Book” (1968) 
David Banner, “Elvis” (2017) Lil Wayne, “A Milli” (2008) 
 
Likewise, one popular video on YouTube compiles numerous hit songs that 
all use the same four chords in their harmonies.116 
Each instance of borrowing raises a question of infringement that must 
be determined based on the facts of each case. Some similarities in musical 
works may be due to independent creation by songwriters—which does not 
constitute infringement.117 On the other hand, some borrowing may be due 
to cryptomnesia, or what copyright law calls “subconscious copying”: peo-
ple may recall an arresting tune they heard from the past but believe they 
                                                                                                                           
 116 The Axis of Awesomeness, YOUTUBE (July 20, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
oOlDewpCfZQ. 
 117 See Watt v. Butler, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (“Proof of independent 
creation . . . fully negates a claim of infringement unless the plaintiff can show actual copying.”). 
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are creating something new.118 Copyright law treats subconscious copying 
as potentially infringing. The doctrine of subconscious copying dates back 
to Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, an early musical work infringement case 
from 1924.119 In finding infringement, Judge Learned Hand explained: 
Whether he unconsciously copied the figure, he cannot say, and 
does not try to. Everything registers somewhere in our memories, 
and no one can tell what may evoke it. On the whole, my belief is 
that, in composing the accompaniment to the refrain of ‘Kalua,’ 
Mr. Kern must have followed, probably unconsciously, what he 
had certainly often heard only a short time before. I cannot really 
see how else to account for a similarity, which amounts to identi-
ty. So to hold I need not reject his testimony that he was unaware 
of such a borrowing . . . . It is no excuse that in so doing his 
memory has played him a trick.120 
Thus, even when songwriters believe they are independently creating a new 
song, it could be that they are recalling bits and pieces of songs they heard 
in the past. It may therefore be difficult for any composer to distinguish 
with certainty independent creation from subconscious copying. 
Songwriters sometimes openly admit to borrowing from other works. In 
their celebrated case against the estate of Marvin Gaye, both Pharrell Wil-
liams and Robin Thicke admitted, in separate interviews, to drawing from 
Gaye’s music, although they denied that what they did constituted infringe-
ment.121 In response to repeated allegations of plagiarism, especially in the 
lyrics of some of his songs, Bob Dylan replied: “[I]n folk and jazz, quotation 
is a rich and enriching tradition.”122 Likewise, Paul McCartney said that John 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Carissa L. Alden, Note, A Proposal to Replace the Subconscious Copying Doctrine, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1729, 1750–51 (2008). 
 119 Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 120 Id. (emphasis added). 
 121 See Pharrell Williams ‘You Can’t Trademark a Groove,’ ALL ACCESS (Mar. 5, 2014), 
https://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story/127456/pharrell-williams-you-can-t-trademark-
a-groove [https://perma.cc/B7G7-NVUA] (“We are dealing with the idea that someone feels like a 
groove is proprietary and it is not. Music is, and the notes are, and when you look at sheet music, 
then you’d know. And just for a bit of humor, the percussion that I used on ‘Blurred Lines’ aside 
from the music notation being completely different, completely different . . . but the percussion, I 
was trying to pretend that I was MARVIN GAYE and what he would do had he went down to 
NASHVILLE and did a record with pentatonic harmonies and more of a bluegrass chord structure. 
So unfortunately, there is no comparison between the minor bluesy chords he was playing and my 
major bluegrass-y chords and that’s very plain to see for anyone who can read music.”); Phili, 
supra note 6. 
 122 Mikal Gilmore, Bob Dylan Unleashed, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.
rollingstone.com/music/news/bob-dylan-unleashed-a-wild-ride-on-his-new-lp-and-striking-back-
at-critics-20120927 [https://perma.cc/G79L-29QE]. 
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Lennon incorporated elements from Bob Dylan’s 1964 album, “Another Side 
of Dylan,” on the 1965 Beatles song, “You’ve Got to Hide Your Love 
Away.”123 Metallica guitar player Kirk Hammett gave David Bowie credit 
after the artist’s death, including admitting to the band’s borrowing the main 
riff of Bowie’s “Andy Warhol” for the metal band’s iconic 1986 track, “Mas-
ter of Puppets.”124 Chris Martin of Coldplay has indicated borrowing from 
Jeff Buckley and Radiohead,125 and Coldplay has been accused of other copy-
ing. Rap pioneer Ice-T admits that he borrowed Schoolly D’s “syncopation” 
and “vocal delivery” from Schoolly D’s 1985 song “P.S.K. What Does It 
Mean” for use on Ice-T’s track, “6 ’N the Mornin.”126 The Strokes’ Julian 
Casablancas admits that the band incorporated Tom Petty and the Heartbreak-
ers’ 1977 song “American Girl” into their chart-topping rock single “Last 
Nite” in 2001.127 When sampling of sound recordings is considered, the ex-
tent of borrowing of music becomes even greater.128 
These examples show that music borrowing is a practice not limited to 
amateurs, wannabe artists, or “pirates.” Prominent, successful, and estab-
lished musicians have engaged in music borrowing in creating their own 
music. 
2. The Nature of Music Produces Similarities 
What might explain the practice of borrowing in music? Are compos-
ers who borrow just lazy or unethical? Perhaps. But a more plausible expla-
nation relates to the limits of combining musical notes. The limited number 
of musical notes that exist, and the limited number of musical notes that 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See WILLIAM J. DOWLDING, BEATLESONGS 98–99 (1989). 
 124 See Kirk Hammett: David Bowie ‘Was a Pretty Huge Influence on Me and Other People’ 
in Metallica, BLABBERMOUTH.NET (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.blabbermouth.net/news/kirk-
hammett-david-bowie-was-a-pretty-huge-influence-on-me-and-other-people-in-metallica/ [https://
perma.cc/V7LZ-AASH]. 
 125 See Albert Costill, 6 Reasons Why Coldplay Are Guilty of Plagiarism, EVOLVOR.COM 
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://evolvor.com/2008/12/19/6-reasons-why-coldplay-are-guilty-of-plagiarism/ 
[https://perma.cc/KQG8-EDVR]. 
 126 See Hao Nguyen, Hip-Hop Gem: Ice-T’s “6 in the Mornin’” Was Inspired by Schoolly D’s 
“P.S.K. What Does It Mean?,” STOP THE BREAKS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.stopthebreaks.
com/gems/ice-t-6-in-the-mornin-inspired-by-schoolly-d-psk/ [https://perma.cc/XWB7-HXJS]. 
 127 See Garin Pirnia, Last Nite, ROLLING STONE (May 7, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/
music/news/last-nite-the-strokes [https://perma.cc/MR97-4PFN] (quoting Julian Casablancas as 
saying “Yeah, we ripped it off. Where you been?” in reference to Tom Petty’s song, “American 
Girl”). 
 128 See generally Jeremy Beck, Music Composition, Sound Recordings and Digital Sampling 
in the 21st Century: A Legislative and Legal Framework to Balance Competing Interests, 13 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the relevant legal issues and current music industry 
practices with respect to digital sampling). 
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sound harmonious together, make similarities in compositions common, if 
not inevitable. As the Second Circuit recognized: 
Musical signs available for combinations are about 13 in number. 
They are tones produced by striking in succession the white and 
black keys as they are found on the keyboard of the piano. It is 
called the chromatic scale. In a popular song, the composer must 
write a composition arranging combinations of these tones limited 
by the range of the ordinary voice and by the skill of the ordinary 
player. To be successful, it must be a combination of tones that 
can be played as well as sung by almost any one. Necessarily, 
within these limits, there will be found some similarity of tone 
succession.129 
Or, as one commentator described: 
The average composer who indulges in songs has a limited num-
ber of tones at his disposal. The combinations and permutations 
of thirteen tones gives the amazing total of 6,227,020,800 combi-
nations, of which only a small fraction may be used ordinarily. 
Popular songs, particularly, lie within a very small radius. In a 
confined space, similarity of tone construction is inevitable. Prac-
tically every original idea the composer can think of has appeared 
somewhere before; it is a matter of probabilities, and every day 
the number of new possibilities grows less.130 
Thus, another reason why we might expect fair use to surface in music 
cases is the very nature of music. Music possesses distinct qualities that 
make it common for two or more songwriters to create, intentionally or oth-
erwise, songs that have some elements that sound similar, but not an exact 
copy of each other. Fair use, among other doctrines such as scenes a faire, 
would provide a safety valve in copyright law to allow such unavoidable 
similarities in the composition of music. 
Even more provocative is the possibility that humans are, in essence, 
hard-wired to produce certain patterns in music. Musicologists, neuroscien-
tists, psychologists, and cognitive biologists have made important strides in 
identifying potential universal patterns in music that may derive from how 
humans think. As Steven Brown and Joseph Jordania put it: 
In a world of more than 4,500 singing species, only one species—
Homo sapiens—lives on the ground, and only one species—
                                                                                                                           
 129 Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923). 
 130 SHAFTER, supra note 110, at 155. 
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Homo sapiens—has the ability to follow precise rhythmic pat-
terns so as to permit group singing, drumming, and dancing. What 
explains the unique place of humans among singing species?131  
Building on Bruno Nettl’s work, Brown and Jordania propose an elaborate 
list of seventy possible “universals” or common music patterns that bridge 
cultures.132 Their theory includes comparable lists of universals for the 
range of components of music, including rhythm, melodic structure and 
texture, form, vocal style, expressive devices, and instruments.133 
Recent studies appear to validate the theory of music universals, alt-
hough more study is needed. One experiment asked non-musicians to repeat 
a pattern of beats by replaying them on an electronic drum pad.134 Forty-
eight students participated in the study, divided into six chains of eight stu-
dents.135 Instead of recreating the beats exactly as the original, each chain 
ended up recreating a beat similar to a universal of rhythm, including:  
• A regularly spaced (isochronous) underlying beat, akin to an implicit 
metronome.  
• Hierarchical organization of beats of unequal strength, so that some 
events in time are marked with respect to others. 
• Grouping of beats in two (for example, marches) or three (for example, 
waltzes).  
• A preference of binary (2-beat) groupings.  
• Clustering of beat durations around a few values distributed in less 
than five durational categories. 
• The use of durations from different categories to construct riffs, that is, 
rhythmic motifs or tunes.136 
Likewise, psychologists have conducted studies that indicate infants possess 
universal preferences for certain music patterns, such as consonance over 
dissonance.137 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Steven Brown & Joseph Jordania, Universals in the World’s Musics, 41 PSYCHOL. MUSIC 
229, 230 (2013). 
 132 Id. at 238–41. 
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 134 See generally Andrea Ravignani et al., Musical Evolution in the Lab Exhibits Rhythmic 
Universals, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2016). 
 135 Id. at 5. 
 136 Id. at 1. 
 137 Laurel J. Trainor & Becky M. Heinmiller, The Development of Evaluative Responses to 
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2018] Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases 1897 
Another factor that may be at play is that today’s “hit songs” are often 
being created by the same producers, who use similar electronic and com-
puting technology to manufacture hits that people like.138 Once a producer 
figures out how to make a hit, the same producer may use the same or simi-
lar method in turning out other hits. Granted, new music still has to sound 
fresh. But each decade has been known for certain styles of music that dom-
inated in popularity. 
In sum, music often reflects similar composition, which may be due to 
a variety of factors, including conscious or subconscious borrowing among 
composers and the very nature and limitations of music as well as universal 
preferences among humans. In such a field of creative activity, where pat-
terns are common and perhaps, in some instances, universal, we would ex-
pect fair use to provide a safety valve for composers to borrow elements of 
prior songs to create new, transformative works. As explained next, howev-
er, it has not. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FAIR USE OF MUSICAL WORKS 
This Part summarizes the empirical study conducted to determine the 
prevalence of fair use defenses in cases involving a musical work alleged to 
have copied portions of another musical work.139 The major findings are: (i) 
in nearly forty years of decisions under the 1976 Copyright Act, only one 
decision has ever recognized a non-parody fair use of a musical work de-
spite the prevalence of music infringement cases (and the one decision may 
not have even involved a musical work given the absence of music in the 
underlying work); (ii) very few defendants have pursued a fair use defense 
in music cases; and (iii) nonetheless, music defendants have prevailed in the 
majority of cases on grounds other than fair use. 
A. Study Design 
1. Scope of Music Cases 
The study examined all musical work infringement cases that involved 
a decision of some kind contained in the Westlaw database from 1978 (the 
effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) to January 15, 2018.140 The cases 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See JOHN SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE HIT FACTORY 5 (2015); cf. Jon 
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 139 See infra notes 139–163 and accompanying text. 
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ered were listings of cases from the Music Infringement Resource, an online database sponsored 
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identified involved (i) a musical work that was alleged to have infringed (ii) 
the copyright of another musical work. Such cases will be referred to as 
“music cases” for short. The survey was meant to identify disputes that 
could plausibly contain fair use claims for same-type transformative musi-
cal works as discussed in Part I.141 
The focus of the study was on two works in the same category of copy-
right subject matter; here, two musical works.142 One would expect this fact 
pattern to produce fair use defenses for same-type transformative works, as 
discussed above, based on the precedent recognizing fair uses within other 
categories of copyright subject matter, such as quotation of a literary work for 
use in another literary work, or copying of parts of a pictorial work for use in 
another pictorial work.143 
Cases asserting claims involving only sound recording copyrights were 
also excluded.144 Although one could examine copying of parts of a sound 
recording as possible same-type transformative works, the issue has pro-
duced considerable controversy for reasons other than fair use. The Copy-
right Act treats the sound recording copyright, which was recognized in 
1972, differently and more narrowly in some respects.145 Also, the circuits 
have split over whether de minimis copying is allowed as a defense to the 
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 141 See supra notes 82–138 and accompanying text. 
 142 Sometimes, the defendant incorporated what might arguably be classified as a musical 
work into an audio-visual work, such as a commercial. These cases were generally included in the 
survey, as long as the defendant’s putative musical work was not simply the exact same work as 
the plaintiff’s musical work. Excluded from this survey were a few cases involving uses of a copy-
right holder’s musical work without any change in the musical work or, in one case, uses of a 
copyright holder’s audiovisual work recorded on YouTube videos. See, e.g., Estate of Barré v. 
Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 912 (E.D. La. 2017) (defendant’s use of recordings of plaintiff speak-
ing a few lines on YouTube videos); Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant’s use of 15 seconds of song “Imagine” in movie); Byrne v. British 
Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (defendant’s use part of plaintiff’s 
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701, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (defendant’s use of part of plaintiff’s song as background music for 
educational program). These cases do not involve a defendant artist or composer attempting to 
create a new musical work based on a prior musical work. Curiously, all of these cases involved 
assertions of fair use. See Estate of Barré, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (rejecting defendants’ motion to 
dismiss based in part on possibility of plaintiff proving infringement and of defendants not estab-
lishing fair use); Lennon, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (preliminary injunction denied given defendants’ 
likelihood of prevailing on fair use defense); Byrne, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (summary judgment 
not granted where fact issues remained on fair use); Higgins, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (summary 
judgment granted finding fair use). 
 143 See supra notes 82–106 and accompanying text. 
 144 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 145 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (setting out a series of limitations on the exclusive rights of 
the owner of a sound recording copyright). 
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assertion of sound recording copyrights.146 The controversy over music 
sampling—taking parts of someone else’s recording—has generated disa-
greement among courts and commentators.147 
In sum, the study examined cases involving two competing musical 
works where the copyright asserted pertains to the plaintiff’s musical work. 
In all, 177 music cases from this approximately forty-year period were iden-
tified, which amounts to an average of 4.425 music cases annually. If a case 
resulted in several decisions at the trial or appellate courts, it was counted as 
just one case. Of the 177 cases, 127 (72%) resulted in a decision on the 
merits of the copyright claim. 
2. Study Limitations 
The study examined copyright cases that involved a decision reported 
in Westlaw. Given that most copyright cases filed eventually settle and that 
many uses of copyrighted works are not disputed, much less litigated, the 
possible selection effect of this study precludes any generalizable conclu-
sion about the prevalence of fair use in music compositions.148 Whether 
composers make fair uses and accept fair uses of their works by others, in 
practice, cannot be determined without examining the myriad of musical 
works that are not subject to litigation or a court decision. In other words, 
musicians might engage in borrowing of elements of other musical works—
perhaps believing such borrowing is fair use—without ever licensing the 
use or being challenged in litigation. I suspect, however, if fair use was 
widely recognized among musicians, we would see at least some non-
                                                                                                                           
 146 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) 
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101 IOWA L. REV. 1065 (2016) (noting that legal empirical studies are imperfect because they are 
limited by the fact that most civil cases are settled or end without a written opinion). 
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parody fair use defenses in the music cases, which we did not find except in 
one recent decision involving spoken words, not music. 
The survey also examined the decisions to see if fair use was men-
tioned. But it is possible that some defendants in these cases listed fair use 
as a defense in their answers but did not pursue it to judgment. The survey 
did not examine the pleadings except in a few limited instances not included 
in the results. The survey assumed that the courts’ failure to mention fair use 
in ruling on the infringement claims meant that, at the very least, the de-
fendants did not pursue fair use as their primary defense. And, in cases 
where the defendants lost and the decisions did not even mention fair use, 
the survey inferred that the defendants did not pursue fair use to judgment. 
Thus, the survey gives us a picture of what happens in music cases that 
are resolved by courts. Who wins and who loses, and for what reasons, are 
detailed in the results of the survey. 
B. Results from Survey of Musical Works Cases 
1. Fair Use of Musical Works Is Rarely Discussed in Decisions 
The first major finding of the survey is that fair use is rarely discussed 
in final decisions of music cases. In the majority of music cases, defendants 
prevailed on grounds other than fair use, thus in some respects obviating the 
need for the fair use defense in most music cases. 
As Figure 1 below indicates,149 91% (116 of 127) of the decisions did 
not discuss fair use at all. Most of these cases—82.7% (105 of 127)—
resulted in a finding of no infringement or liability against the defendant(s). 
Thus, to a large extent, a fair use defense was unnecessary for music de-
fendants to prevail. Only 8.7% (11 of 127) of the decisions found infringe-
ment without discussing fair use. 
By contrast, approximately 9% of the decisions referred to fair use, 
with the following breakdown: 
• 3.1% (4 of 127) of the decisions found no infringement and mentioned 
fair use but did not rule on it (in one case because the defendant did 
not raise it);150 
                                                                                                                           
 149 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
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 150 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 539 (1994) (fair use mentioned, but not decid-
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• 3.9% (5 of 127) of the decisions involved successful parody fair uses;151 
• 0.8% (1 of 127) involved an unsuccessful defense of parody fair use;152  
• 0.8% (1 of 127) involved a successful defense of non-parody fair use.153 
 Notably, only one U.S. court has ever recognized, in a published deci-
sion under the 1976 Copyright Act, a non-parody fair use of a putative mu-
sical work. That case, Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, involved the 
use of only a portion of a spoken rap by the late jazz artist Jimmy Smith, 
not accompanied by music, to introduce his album Off the Top.154 In that 
respect, the case resembles a typical fair use case involving a quotation of a 
literary work. In fact, as discussed above, the work “Jimmy Smith Rap” 
may not even constitute a musical work under the Copyright Office’s defini-
tion of musical work, which requires music to be an element of the compo-
sition.155 I have included the case in the survey, given that the court ap-
peared to assume without deciding that the work was a musical composition 
as the plaintiffs claimed.156 Even then, the case is an outlier. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994); Fisher v. Dees, 794 
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 152 See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 153 Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
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 155 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Estate of Smith, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 743, 751 (noting the plaintiffs’ assertion of copy-
right in the composition of “Jimmy Smith Rap” but characterizing the nature of the work only as a 
“creative work” in the fair use analysis).  
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Figure 1. Results of Musical Work Cases 
 
2. Most Music Defendants Prevail on Other Grounds 
One reason that fair use is not prevalent in music cases is that defend-
ants prevail on other grounds and do so at a fairly high rate in the entire 
universe of music cases surveyed. In some respects, fair use isn’t needed. 
Defendants prevailed in 86% of the music cases (109 of 127) on grounds 
other than fair use, while defendants raised successful fair use defenses in 
only a few cases—4% (5 of 127) of the decisions (parody fair use), and less 
than 1% (1 of 127) involved a successful non-parody fair use.157 Collective-
ly, defendants prevailed in 91% (115 of 127) of the music cases decided.158 
On what grounds have defendants prevailed? As shown in Figure 2 be-
low,159 the most successful defense relates to the test of infringement: ap-
proximately 61.7% (71 of 115) of the cases in which the defendant pre-
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vailed turned on the courts’ application of elements of the test of infringe-
ment, either the defendant’s lack of access to the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work (31.3%, or 36 of 115) or the lack of substantial similarity between the 
two songs (30.4%, of 35 of 115). A few cases recognized or assumed that 
the defendant copied portions of the plaintiff’s song but ruled in the defend-
ant’s favor: 7.8% (9 of 115) found that the defendant copied unprotected or 
uncopyrightable elements, and 4.3% (5 of 115) found de minimis copying. 
Additionally, 2.6% (3 of 115) of cases relied on more than one of these rea-
sons, but not fair use, while 19.1% (22 of 115) of the cases defendants pre-
vailed based on other reasons or reasons not identifiable from the decisions 
(such as a jury verdict). As mentioned above, roughly 4% of the cases de-
cided in favor of the defendant involved successful fair use defenses. In 
short, fair use is seldom the reason why defendants have so often prevailed 
in music cases.  
Figure 2. Reasons Courts Ruled in Favor of Defendants in Music Cases 
 
 Given the relatively high success rate of defendants in music cases on 
grounds other than fair use, the lack of discussion of fair use in music cases 
is understandable to some degree. Part III revisits this issue in greater detail 
and offers possible explanations for this result.160 
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3. Most Losing Music Defendants Do Not Pursue Fair Use Defenses 
Defendants have lost in a small minority of the music cases (9%, or 12 
of 127). Surprisingly, even in the music cases in which defendants lost, fair 
use was rarely litigated. Only one decision even discussed fair use, ultimately 
rejecting the parody fair use defense.161 Curiously, a defense of non-parody 
fair use is absent from every music infringement case in which the defendant 
lost. This was true, even though some of these cases seemed well-suited for a 
fair use argument, such as the case involving Pharrell and Thicke,162 or the 
case involving Michael Bolton’s 1991 hit “Love Is a Wonderful Thing,” 
which was found to have infringed the Isley Brothers’ 1966 song by the same 
name.163 Bottom line, win or lose, defendants in music cases typically did not 
pursue fair use defenses outside of parodies. 
III. THE THEORY OF FAIR USE AVOIDANCE 
Part III sets forth a new theory of fair use avoidance to help explain the 
results of the empirical study described in Part II.164 Both litigants and 
courts may decide to avoid pursuing a fair use defense for various reasons, 
even when a case might lend itself to fair use as either a primary or second-
ary defense. Although it is difficult to conclusively determine why non-
parody fair use has not been recognized in music cases, despite the relative-
ly high number of music cases that have been decided, this part offers sev-
eral hypotheses.165 Of course, more than one reason may explain why both 
litigants and courts have avoided fair use in music cases for decades. 
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A. General Theory of Avoidance 
Before considering fair use avoidance, this section discusses avoidance 
more generally in litigation and judicial decisions.166 
1. Avoidance by Litigants 
When it comes to legal disputes, litigants, typically upon the advice of 
their lawyers, employ avoidance strategies in whether and how to litigate a 
case. The prime example is when parties avoid lawsuits altogether through 
settlement. The vast majority of cases, including copyright cases, settle.167 
Settlement helps parties avoid costly litigation and the uncertainty of result 
when the decision is left to a jury or court.168 Settlement also helps litigants 
avoid the possibility that a court might set a bad precedent detrimental to 
their long-term interests. 
Alternatively, litigants may decide to pursue a case, but may avoid cer-
tain arguments or positions within litigation for a variety of reasons. One 
obvious reason is that the litigant’s attorney believes the argument is a los-
ing argument or has no chance of succeeding. For example, litigants might 
avoid raising constitutional challenges, which might seem to be desperate or 
unlikely to prevail, although the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Matal v. Tam 
decision in 2017 shows that constitutional challenges sometimes prevail 
even in the face of directly adverse lower court precedent.169 In addition, an 
argument or position might be perceived by the litigant or attorney as in-
consistent with the facts or theory of the case,170 the overall litigation strate-
gy, the litigant’s professional or personal beliefs, or an industry or profes-
sional norm or position. Also, the uncertainty of an argument or the lack of 
clear precedent may contribute to litigants’ avoidance of the position. Pre-
sumably, if an argument was perceived as having a high probability of suc-
cess, the attorney would strongly recommend pursuing it, even if it ran 
counter to the client’s beliefs or industry norms. But ultimately it’s the cli-
ent’s decision to make. 
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 168 Fitzpatrick, supra note 167, at 1641. 
 169 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (affirming a challenge to the disparage-
ment clause of the Lanham Act as unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause). A panel of the Federal Circuit initially refused to register the trademark as disparaging, 
but upon rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit vacated the panel’s judgment and remanded. See 
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 170 See generally Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 298 (2002) 
(noting the importance for litigants to develop a case theory to fit the facts within, and to tell a 
story about what the case is about). 
1906 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1873 
2. Avoidance by Courts 
Courts employ avoidance strategies as well. The most well-recognized 
avoidance doctrine is the doctrine of constitutional doubt. This doctrine holds 
that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise se-
rious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.”171 This canon of statutory construction is justified as a matter of judi-
cial prudence and a display of respect for Congress, a co-equal branch of 
government. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]his approach not only re-
flects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly con-
fronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and 
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.”172 Cass Sunstein suggests that the 
doctrine of constitutional doubt can also be viewed as a form of democracy-
enhancing judicial minimalism by which courts recognize that “constitution-
ally troublesome judgments ought to be made by politically accountable bod-
ies, and not by bureaucrats and administrators.”173 In Sunstein’s view, some-
times courts intentionally “[l]eav[e] things undecided.”174 
Judicial minimalism may be especially appropriate to deal with “an is-
sue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and on which 
the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise).”175 These issues need not be con-
stitutional issues; they could simply be difficult or complex issues of statu-
tory or common law. The basic premise is that, if given two paths to decide 
a case, one easy and the other hard, courts will tend to choose the path of 
least resistance. Why? They do so for reasons of judicial economy and, for 
multi-member appellate courts, agreement among different judges. Moreo-
ver, this inclination for courts to choose the path of least resistance is not 
simply about opting for what’s easy. Lower courts may also be concerned 
about reversal of their decisions, so embarking on a complex or novel issue 
of law, with little or no precedent, increases the likelihood of reversal com-
pared to the path of least resistance. 
3. Examples of Avoidance in Copyright Law 
Courts have routinely used avoidance strategies in copyright law. Be-
fore discussing fair use avoidance in the next section, it is worth noting a 
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few of the other areas in copyright law in which courts have adopted avoid-
ance strategies to appreciate how pervasive avoidance is. 
The Supreme Court’s doctrine in dealing with First Amendment chal-
lenges to copyright law is a prime example of judicial avoidance.176 In both 
the 2002 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft and the 2012 decision in Golan v. 
Holder, the Court took the approach that, generally, no First Amendment 
scrutiny of copyright law is necessary because copyright law has “built-in 
free speech safeguards,” including fair use and the idea-expression dichot-
omy.177 The Court left open the possibility of applying First Amendment 
scrutiny where “Congress has . . . altered the traditional contours of copy-
right protection.”178 In a recent trademark case, Justice Kennedy suggested 
during oral argument that a copyright law that authorized the Copyright Of-
fice to deny registration to works deemed to be disparaging of people would 
violate the First Amendment’s protection against viewpoint discrimina-
tion.179 Nevertheless, in the typical copyright case, courts will not even ap-
ply First Amendment scrutiny to copyright law. The Court’s approach in 
Eldred and Golan indicates its general reluctance to apply First Amendment 
scrutiny to copyright law.180 
Although legal scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s insulation 
of copyright law from First Amendment scrutiny,181 the Court’s approach can 
be viewed as a judicial avoidance strategy. Instead of opening the floodgates 
to First Amendment challenges in run-of-the-mill copyright cases, the Court 
opted to avoid such challenges while leaving open the possibility of applying 
First Amendment scrutiny in an exceptional case. The result of this ruling is 
that courts avoid thorny constitutional questions that would likely require 
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some difficult balancing of copyright versus free speech interests.182 The 
Court’s approach minimizes the number of copyright cases in which First 
Amendment challenges can arise by employing a doctrinal strategy of avoid-
ance. The approach may not be entirely satisfying, but it has some virtue in 
avoiding repeated constitutional challenges to copyright law. The approach is 
similar to the constitutional doubt doctrine in that the approach allows courts 
to avoid having to decide constitutional challenges by interpreting the Copy-
right Act as containing First Amendment safety valves that insulate copyright 
law from First Amendment challenges. 
The principle of aesthetic non-discrimination provides another exam-
ple of judicial avoidance. In the Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Holmes famously wrote: “It would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”183 Holmes was cautioning against al-
lowing judges to go beyond their competence in the service of, for example, 
deciding which works were works of “fine art” or otherwise deserving of a 
copyright.184 Except for “the narrowest and most obvious limits,” judges are 
not equipped to make aesthetic determinations and therefore should avoid 
doing so in copyright cases.185 As the saying goes, beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder. 
Beyond concerns of judicial competence, the principle of aesthetic 
non-discrimination may also be justified as a way for courts to avoid First 
Amendment problems.186 If courts were called upon to discriminate based 
on the content of works in determining which works deserved copyrights, 
serious First Amendment problems would be raised. Such discrimination 
would likely constitute impermissible content discrimination. But courts 
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need not decide the constitutionality of such a practice because the aesthetic 
non-discrimination principle avoids the problem altogether. 
A more recent example of copyright avoidance is provided by the 2005 
decision in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.187 There, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York expressly avoided the application of 
the well-recognized idea-expression dichotomy to photographs or visual 
works.188 Judge Kaplan avoided analyzing the idea-expression dichotomy 
because he found it be ill-suited to visual works: 
In the visual arts, the distinction breaks down. For one thing, it is 
impossible in most cases to speak of the particular “idea” cap-
tured, embodied, or conveyed by a work of art because every ob-
server will have a different interpretation. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that there is any real distinction between the idea in a work 
of art and its expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to 
depict a particular subject in a particular way . . . . In other words, 
those elements of a photograph, or indeed, any work of visual art 
protected by copyright, could just as easily be labeled “idea” as 
“expression.”189 
Judge Kaplan’s reason for avoidance is similar to Justice Holmes’s in 
Bleistein; both shy away from judicial decision-making that would be high-
ly subjective or lacking in administrable principles that fall within the com-
petence of judges. As suggested below, perhaps one reason courts and liti-
gants avoid fair use defenses in music cases is the difficulty of articulating a 
transformative purpose to musical sounds or notes, just as it would be diffi-
cult to articulate what the idea of a sound is.190 
B. Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases 
With a basic understanding of avoidance theory, we can now turn to 
the main subject of this Article: fair use avoidance in music cases. Parties, 
their respective attorneys, and courts may avoid fair use in music cases for a 
variety of reasons. The following section sets forth several hypotheses to 
explain the results of the survey in Part II.191 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 188 Id. at 458. 
 189 Id. at 458–59. 
 190 See infra notes 242–252 and accompanying text. 
 191 Id. 
1910 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1873 
1. Potential Reasons Why Musicians May Elect to Avoid Fair Use Defenses 
a. Ease of Settlement: Song Credit and Royalties 
Although the study discussed in Part II did not include music disputes 
that ultimately settled, it deserves mentioning that the existence of an estab-
lished practice of handling songwriting disputes within the music industry 
may diminish the invocation of fair use in such disputes. It is not uncom-
mon for song writers accused of copyright infringement by other song writ-
ers, especially ones who are established musicians, to agree to share—
sometimes begrudgingly—songwriting credit and royalties.192 
For example, the British pop star Sam Smith won the Grammy for rec-
ord of the year for his hit song “Stay with Me” in 2015.193 The song sold 
close to four million copies in one year.194 Smith, however, agreed to a set-
tlement that shared songwriting credit and 12.5% royalties with Tom Petty 
and Jeff Lynne due to similarities in the melodies of “Stay with Me” and the 
1989 hit “I Won’t Back Down,” written by Petty and Lynne.195 Smith and 
his two co-authors, James Napier and William Phillips, claimed they were 
not even familiar with Petty’s 1989 hit song written over twenty-five years 
earlier and that the similarities between the two works were “coincidental,” 
but they nonetheless quickly settled the dispute.196 Petty stated: “All my 
years of songwriting have shown me these things can happen. Most times 
you catch it before it gets out the studio door but in this case it got by . . . . 
Sam did the right thing and I have thought no more about this. A musical 
accident no more no less.”197 Other popular musicians, including the Black 
Eyed Peas, Demi Lovato, and Ed Sheeran, have opted to settle claims by 
giving songwriting credit and royalties to the original songwriters.198 
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b. Availability of Other Defenses, Some of Which Do Not Admit Copying 
A major reason that fair use does not appear with much frequency in 
music cases is that other arguments have been more successful or attractive 
to defendants.199 Thus far, the success rate of defendants avoiding liability 
in music cases has been high.200 The success of those defenses—for exam-
ple, the lack of access to the plaintiff’s work, lack of similarities, copying 
unprotected elements, and de minimis copying—may present defendants or, 
more aptly, defense counsel with a positive feedback loop to continue to use 
what prevailed in other cases in the past.201 Success breeds, not only suc-
cess, but repeated attempts at achieving the same success by the established 
arguments. Although defendants could argue in the alternative that any cop-
ying they committed constituted a fair use, music defendants do not often 
pursue or press a fair use defense.202 
One possible reason that fair use is less attractive, at least compared to 
the defense of lack of access to or lack of similarity between the works—
the two most successful bases in music cases203—is that unlike those de-
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fenses, fair use assumes that the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work.204 
Music defendants may pursue defenses other than fair use when the defend-
ants did not copy the plaintiffs’ songs—or, at least, the defendants do not 
believe they copied or were not conscious of any copying. As discussed in 
greater depth below, coincidental similarities between songs probably oc-
curs with some frequency, given the limited number of musical notes, tones, 
and rhythms.205 Accordingly, to the extent composers or songwriters be-
lieved they independently created a song, they may be less inclined to admit 
copying or borrowing a portion of a prior work even as an alternative de-
fense of fair use. After all, musicians have their professional reputation to 
worry about and copying other works, even in part, might make it sound 
like the musicians didn’t write their own songs. Notwithstanding the com-
mon practice of settling music cases by granting songwriting credit and 
royalties, songwriters accused of music infringement might prefer defenses 
that are consistent with the explanation that they independently created their 
own music.  
The dynamics of avoiding an admission of copying, even for the pur-
pose of pursuing a fair use defense, may play out differently depending on 
whether the litigants are “established” in the music industry.206 For the pur-
poses of the survey, several indicia of “established artist” were used to cate-
gorize the parties: an artist who (1) was signed to a major record label or 
music publisher, (2) wrote, performed, or was credited on a song listed on 
the Billboard chart, (3) wrote, performed, or was credited on a gold or plati-
num record, or (4) had national recognition via a biography on AllMusic or 
Wikipedia.207 Music labels and music publishers were considered estab-
lished in the music industry. 
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i. Unestablished v. Established Artists or Music Entities 
Of the music infringement decisions surveyed, 54% (68 of 127) were 
brought by individuals who were not established in the music industry.208 All 
except two of these lawsuits involved a copyright claim against a “bigger” or 
more prominent defendant, whether an established musician, a music pub-
lisher, or label. In such “Unestablished v. Established” cases, when a plaintiff 
who is relatively unknown or unestablished in the music industry (an “unes-
tablished songwriter”) accuses an established musician, music publisher, or 
label of copyright infringement, the “established” defendant probably does 
not view the fair use defense as an appropriate or attractive option. 
At least some of these Unestablished v. Established cases might in-
volve frivolous claims brought by an unestablished songwriter hoping to 
strike it rich based on some putative similarity in the music. For example, 
an unestablished rap artist named Anthony Woods, who was in prison at the 
time of the lawsuit, sued Lil Wayne for $51.1 million for allegedly infring-
ing the copyright to a mixtape Woods posted online.209 Woods, who repre-
sented himself, made no specific factual allegation that Lil Wayne ever 
heard Woods’ mixtape.210 The court dismissed the case for lack of substan-
tial similarities between the respective songs of Woods and Lil Wayne.211 In 
this scenario, asserting fair use seems incongruous. If the defendant did not 
copy, why argue fair use? Disputing a basic element of infringement—that 
the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work—by asserting that the defendant 
did not have access to the plaintiff’s work or that there are no probative 
similarities in the competing songs is the more logical choice. Fair use just 
does not fit the facts. 
The fact that a plaintiff is relatively unknown in the music industry, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the defendant could not have cop-
ied from the plaintiff. In some cases, the unestablished music plaintiff is 
able to present direct or circumstantial evidence that the established music 
defendant had access to the plaintiff’s song.212 For instance, an unestab-
lished songwriter who is trying to break into the music industry may circu-
late her work to people in the music industry in the hope of being discov-
ered. It is quite possible that, in some instances, an associate of an estab-
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lished artist received a copy of the unestablished songwriter’s work and 
may have borrowed parts of it without her permission. It would be incorrect 
to assume that every music infringement suit brought by an unestablished 
artist involves a frivolous claim.  
ii. Established v. Established Artists or Music Entities 
By contrast, 37% (47 of 127) of the decisions surveyed involved estab-
lished artists or entities suing other established artists or entities.213 The dy-
namics of fair use avoidance are probably different in music cases in which 
both the plaintiff and the defendant are established in the music industry. In 
such cases, one might expect that professional reputation in admitting copy-
ing would be less of a concern. Some of the most successful artists have 
openly admitted borrowing from other successful artists. To return to our 
opening example, Robin Thicke said that “one of my favorite songs of all 
time was Marvin Gaye’s ‘Got to Give It Up.’ I was like, ‘Damn, we should 
make something like that, something with that groove.’”214 Although Thicke 
later recanted that explanation and said Pharrell wrote the song “Blurred 
Lines,” even Pharrell acknowledged “channeling . . . that late ’70s feeling.”215 
Is there any downside to an established artist claiming a fair use of an-
other established artist’s work? For Pharrell and Thicke, perhaps not. Given 
their success, probably no one would think less of their music abilities if 
they asserted they made a fair use of Gaye’s song. On the other hand, per-
haps it sounds better professionally for a songwriter, especially one just 
breaking into the music industry, to say that he is writing all original music 
without copying even a small portion of the style or work of another song-
writer. For example, Sam Smith maintains that he independently created his 
hit song, even while agreeing to a license from Tom Petty.216  
Moreover, as discussed in the next section, some segments of the mu-
sic industry may frown upon fair use defenses due to concerns of opening 
the floodgates to similar defenses raised by amateur songwriters and musi-
cians who attempt to borrow the established artists’ copyrighted music. Es-
tablished artists, many of whom are signed by major labels and publishers, 
may end up toeing the music industry line on fair use, even if they believe 
some borrowing should be considered fair use. Establishing a precedent of 
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fair use can also be used against a songwriter’s own work. Fair use could 
thus be a double-edged sword for creators. This dual nature of fair use ap-
plies beyond music to all other types of works, including computer pro-
grams, other literary works, and pictorial works. Some artists might not 
mind this double-edged quality of fair use, but other established artists 
might prefer receiving royalties for any borrowings of their own works, 
even ones that might be considered fair uses. Just imagine that, in the year 
2040, Sam Smith could assert a copyright claim against a young artist 
whose song sounds similar to “Stay with Me.” Whereas the lack of a fair 
use precedent hurt Smith’s possible defense in the dispute with Petty, it 
would help Smith’s possible copyright claim in the dispute with the young 
artist in the hypothetical scenario.  
c. Music Industry Norms and Practices 
Another possible explanation for the low salience of fair use defenses 
in music cases is that the norms of the music industry might militate against 
it. As explained above, artists might be ambivalent about fair use because it 
acts as double-edged sword, enabling them to borrow from other works but 
allowing their works to be borrowed by others. And perhaps an artist can 
establish greater credibility and acceptance within the music industry if the 
artist is perceived as writing or performing “original” music instead of mu-
sic that openly borrows from other works. 
More generally, the recording industry and the music publishing indus-
try might be less than enamored with promoting fair use, which could facili-
tate unlicensed uses of music. At least in statements to the Copyright Office 
regarding remixes of music, both the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) and National Music Publishers Association (“NMPA”) 
appear to have taken very narrow views of fair use.217 Thus, even if artists 
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routinely borrow from others as an acceptable practice, such artists might be 
reluctant to pursue fair use defenses if the doctrine is not widely promoted 
or accepted by the major music labels and publishers.218 Perhaps the most 
powerful artists or ones with their own labels, such as Beyoncé, can do 
what they want.219 But artists who are signed by the major music labels and 
publishers might not even own the copyrights to the songs they write or per-
form, and even if they do, they still are beholden to the music labels and 
publishers to promote their music. 
In sum, musicians might avoid fair use defenses for a variety of rea-
sons ranging from a lack of fit with the facts or theory of the case, to pro-
fessional concerns and music industry norms that militate against recogniz-
ing fair uses in music.  
2. Potential Reasons Why Courts Have Avoided Fair Use 
a. Defendants Do Not Pursue Fair Use 
Courts may avoid fair use in music cases for a variety of reasons. The 
simplest reason would be if the defendant waived the defense by not assert-
ing it. The defendant has effectively made the decision for the court not to 
consider fair use, even though it may be relevant. The defendants’ avoid-
ance results in the courts’ avoidance as well. If the defendants do not assert 
the defense (as was the case with Pharrell and Robin Thicke), the court will 
not entertain a defense waived by the defendants. In some cases, the de-
fendants asserted the fair use defense in their answers, but apparently ended 
up not pursuing it at trial.220 Of course, this explanation begs the question 
why fair use avoidance by defendants in music cases has persisted for many 
years; several reasons were proffered above. 
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b. Historical Artifact 
Perhaps another factor contributing to the lack of a non-parody fair use 
music decision is historical artifact. Fair use first developed as judge-made 
law in the context of quotations for literary works, with the Circuit Court of 
Massachusetts’ 1841 case Folsom v. Marsh commonly recognized as the 
first fair use decision.221 U.S. copyright law first included musical works 
within the scope of protection in 1831.222 Historically, courts were just de-
veloping a body of fair use precedent when music cases were first decided. 
While fair use was in its infancy, litigants might not have understood how it 
applied, if at all, to respective copyright disputes, including music cases. It 
is therefore not surprising that the old music cases before the 1976 Copy-
right Act did not often consider fair use defenses.223 More typical was the 
view of courts that some adaptation or borrowing to create new music was 
permissible, and simply not infringement.224 Even where infringement was 
found, it was common for the defendant to argue that such similarities in 
music were standard or frequent in other songs and therefore not infring-
ing.225 Thus, because courts entertained arguments for permissible borrow-
ing of music in older copyright cases, fair use was, in some respect, not 
needed—or at the very least, not invoked by name. Indeed, courts generally 
took a narrow view of copyright for musical works.226 The test of infringe-
ment itself could be used to allow some permissible borrowing of musical 
works to create a new work.227  
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 Benjamin Kaplan’s 1967 account of music copyrights espouses this 
view:228  
The musical tradition tolerates considerable definite and deliberate 
borrowing provided the later composer manipulates what he has 
taken. This may be the point of the tale about the composer who, 
treating the Ten Commandments as a musical subject, unabashedly 
took a generous helping from someone else’s work when he came 
to the Commandment “Thou shalt not steal.” Having in mind the 
nature of the audience, the proclivities of music critics, the unlike-
lihood that borrowing diverts profit from the original composer, we 
may agree that the law can afford to take a permissive attitude to-
ward cross-lifting among serious musical works.229 
Although Kaplan wrote his analysis before fair use was codified in the 1976 
Copyright Act, courts had recognized fair use before the passage of the 
1976 Act, as Kaplan discussed in other parts of his book.230 Notably, how-
ever, Kaplan does not conceptualize music borrowing as a fair use, notwith-
standing his discussion of one of the fair use factors recognized by Justice 
Story, i.e., diminishing the profits of the original.231 Instead, as the lead-in to 
that same paragraph makes clear, Kaplan analyzes the issue of music bor-
rowing under infringement, suggesting that borrowing some music from 
another work is permissible, as long as “the later composer manipulates 
what he has taken.”232 In particular, Kaplan points to (1) “the nature of the 
audience,” (2) “the proclivities of music critics,” and (3) “the unlikelihood 
that borrowing diverts profit from the original composer.”233 Presumably, 
the first factor stems from the test of substantial similarity, as infringement 
is analyzed from the point of view of the intended audience of the work. 
This is not to suggest that applying fair use to music cases was not ev-
er entertained before the 1976 Act. Alfred Shafter, for example, discussed 
possible fair use in music saying that among the legitimate uses of a copy-
righted work is “the right of quotation for purposes of research, commen-
tary, criticism or study.”234 Shafter limits the copying of music such as “the 
use of a few bars of a song” to these four purposes in his discussion of fair 
use, and he analyzes examples of copying of music in books, a different 
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medium.235 This kind of copying of music resembles textual quotation for 
use in a literary work. A harder case is presented when the copying of a few 
bars of music for use is used in another musical work, or a same-type trans-
formative work. Could such use in the same medium of music constitute 
fair use? Shafter, writing before the Court’s modern fair use jurisprudence, 
ignored the question and, without discussing the purpose of use, argued that 
copying the style of music is fair use as long as “the melody itself is origi-
nal in the main.”236 Like Kaplan, Shafter focused on infringement over fair 
use.237 E. DeMatt Henderson went a step further in discussing the test of 
infringement for music cases in depth, but also mentioning the possibility of 
a fair use in music: “A ‘fair use’ of a prior composition is allowed by the 
copyright Act, and this issue is largely in the discretion of the court.”238 
The historical treatment of music borrowing—with some borrowing 
permitted under the basic test of infringement—helps to explain the results 
of the survey. Out of 119 cases reaching a judgment, only 15 (13%) found 
infringement.239 Thus, in the vast majority of music cases, the defendants 
have prevailed without needing to rely on a fair use defense. Instead, the 
courts have found no infringement, commonly due to the defendant’s lack 
of access to the plaintiff’s song or the lack of substantial similarities, both 
of which are elements of the basic test of infringement.240 Logically speak-
ing, the question of infringement precedes fair use, so the courts’ preference 
for deciding music cases on the basic liability question makes sense. The 
result is also consistent with the historical treatment of music borrowing by 
early cases predating the 1976 Copyright Act.  
c. Lack of Clear Precedent for Non-Parody Music Fair Use 
Relatedly, the lack of clear precedent recognizing a non-parody fair 
use in music cases may also explain why both litigants and courts avoid it. 
The lack of clear precedent establishes, over time, a self-reinforcing feed-
back loop as courts and litigants opt for the tried-and-true precedent estab-
lishing non-infringement in music cases.241 
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By contrast, fair use in music borrowing raises a difficult question 
whether copying portions of someone else’s music and incorporating it into 
one’s own song “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”242 The case law on transformative use has more often focused on ar-
ticulating a transformative purpose, which perhaps is more contestable or 
difficult to describe in the case of a musical work borrowing from another 
musical work.243 Beyond parody (a comment on the original work), courts 
have not had the opportunity to articulate a transformative purpose in music 
borrowing to create another musical work. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s 2013 decision in Cariou v. Prince offers a different focus 
on transformative content, which is perhaps a better fit with the kind of music 
borrowing discussed herein.244 In applying fair use to music cases, courts 
would have to confront these different approaches to transformative use. 
Take, for example, the “Blurred Lines” case. The court or jury would 
have had to consider whether the song adds new expression to whatever it 
has borrowed from Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up.”245 Pharrell and 
Thicke could argue it does so in the form of both music and lyrics that give 
the new song a distinct twenty-first century dance vibe.  
Although the lyrics of the two songs are different in words, they both 
involve a man’s sexual pursuit of a woman.246 Marvin Gaye uses the meta-
phor of dancing in the beginning of the song, but it soon becomes clear the 
pursuit is (also) about sex: “But if you see me spread out and let me in/Baby 
just party high and low/Let me step into your erotic zone/Move it up/Turn it 
’round/Shake it down/OOWWWW.”247 The title “Got to Give It Up” thus 
has double meaning, relating to both dancing and having sex. By contrast, 
in Pharrell’s song, the woman is already attached to another man, but the 
narrator of the song wants to “liberate” her.248 There’s no dance involved. 
Though she is “a good girl,” she “[m]ust wanna get nasty” (presumably 
meaning having sex) with him in the narrator’s view.249 Although Pharrell’s 
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music bears some similarity to the beat of Marvin Gaye’s song, there’s no 
mistaking that Pharrell’s music sounds like a contemporary pop song, while 
Gaye’s song sounds like an older groove or funk song from the 70s. A rea-
sonable observer arguably can perceive that whatever beat or music Pharrell 
copied from Marvin Gaye has been altered with new, contemporary expres-
sion and meaning for the twenty-first century. There is arguably, in other 
words, a transformative character to Pharrell’s use. 
 But is there a transformative purpose as well? And should a showing 
of such a purpose be required for Pharrell and Thicke to prevail on fair use? 
The answer to both questions is unclear. It is easier to discuss “purpose” 
when referring to a novel than it is to musical notes or a song. After all, 
what’s the meaning or purpose of sounds or musical notes? In one respect, 
all music is meant to entertain. But the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision 
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music instructs that a parody song, even if enter-
taining, has a legitimate fair use purpose to comment on the work paro-
died.250 Perhaps one purpose of “Blurred Lines” might be historical trans-
formation, to recall an older work but to spin out a new work that is fresh 
and modern. Joseph Liu and Justin Hughes have each argued that as a work 
gets older, it should be subject to a more generous scope fair use.251 Apply-
ing that approach here would mean that it should be easier for a songwriter 
to make a fair use of an older song than a contemporary one. For example, 
the passage of time—over 35 years—from Marvin Gaye’s 1977 work 
should perhaps weigh in favor of fair use. Arguably, Pharrell borrowed 
some elements of Gaye’s song in 2014, but added new meaning and expres-
sion to the old vibe of Gaye’s song. But, if Pharrell and Thicke were unsuc-
cessful in articulating a new purpose in borrowing elements of Gaye’s song, 
should that count against their fair use defense? 
Courts have thus far avoided this difficult question of how transforma-
tive purpose and character can be applied to music borrowing outside of 
parodies. Although the defendants appear to be largely responsible for not 
pursuing fair use defenses in music cases, the historical treatment of musi-
cal borrowing by courts before the 1976 Act and the lack of clear precedent 
recognizing non-parody fair use in music probably contribute to the defend-
ants’ avoidance of fair use.252 
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IV. TRADEOFFS OF FAIR USE AVOIDANCE 
This Part considers the tradeoffs of fair use avoidance in music cas-
es.253 Avoidance is not without some advantages, at least from the perspec-
tive of courts in handling music cases. Ultimately, however, the lack of a 
clear fair use precedent for non-parody music cases may have the deleteri-
ous effects of chilling creativity and producing “copyright clutter” by which 
bits of music in older copyrighted works are subject to property rights and 
viewed as off-limits to what would otherwise be transformative uses by oth-
er songwriters.254 
A. Advantages 
From the standpoint of courts, fair use avoidance offers several ad-
vantages. As discussed later, however, it is not clear whether these ad-
vantages outweigh the potential harms to music creation. This section fo-
cuses on the chief advantages that fair use avoidance offers to courts.255 
1. Alternatives Simpler for Courts to Apply Than Fair Use 
One potential advantage of fair use avoidance is that the alternative 
doctrines courts have applied in the majority of music cases (typically find-
ing in favor of defendants and against infringement) are easier to apply. 
These alternative doctrines operate like an on-off switch—the factor is pre-
sent or not. No balancing of multiple factors is needed. Although simplicity 
is not necessarily a virtue in the legal system if it leads to the wrong result, 
simplicity at least enables courts to train their focus on a single factor—for 
example, no access to the work, lack of similarity, only unprotected ele-
ments copied, or de minimis copying—instead of the four-factor balancing 
test of the fair use doctrine. The open-endedness of fair use’s balancing test, 
which must be applied on a case-by-case basis, is both a virtue and a vice. It 
offers flexibility but at the price of predictability.256 This complex inquiry is 
harder to determine and predict than a single-factor test.257 As one commen-
tator notes, “fair use is vague and unpredictable in application, particularly 
when it intersects with the derivative works right.”258 
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2. Courts Avoid the Difficult Question About Transformative Works Versus 
Derivative Works 
Another advantage of fair use avoidance in music cases is avoiding the 
difficult doctrinal question about transformative works versus derivative 
works, discussed above in Part I, that would be raised by such a fair use 
defense. The use of a portion of a musical work to create another musical 
work, such as in the “Blurred Lines” case, would enmesh a court in this dif-
ficult question. Although a few courts have touched upon the issue, the case 
law is far from settled. Indeed, the Second Circuit’s own case law discuss-
ing transformative use in 2015 in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. and in 
2013 in Cariou emphasize two different approaches to the issue—
transformative purpose and transformative content, respectively.259 In 2018, 
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, the Federal Circuit, while conceding 
the possibility that a use of a copyrighted work to create new expression in a 
new context could be transformative, focused instead on finding a trans-
formative purpose, an approach that mirrors the competing strands of the doc-
trine found in prior decisions, without providing clarity to the issue.260 
Thus, to borrow Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism, fair 
use avoidance in music cases may be a convenient way for the courts to 
reach the desired outcome of the case through an incompletely theorized 
agreement.261 A fair use decision in one of the music cases would likely re-
quire greater theorization of the whole concept of transformative works and 
its relationship with and distinction from an infringing derivative work. In-
stead of getting mired in such a doctrinal thicket, courts can reach the same 
desired outcome in a copyright case by resting on simpler reasons. Substan-
tial similarity, lack of protection for uncopyrightable elements, and the de 
minimis defense are relatively simple, straightforward inquiries based on a 
relatively “low-level” theory, if any theory at all.262 
3. Courts Avoid Possible Pandora’s Box of Music Appropriation 
Relatedly, fair use avoidance in music cases permits courts to avoid 
opening a potential Pandora’s box of music appropriation. Perhaps this crit-
icism is a straw man, given that the Cariou decision recognized fair use for 
many of Richard Prince’s appropriation artwork, apparently without disas-
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trous effect on the art community.263 One difference, though, is that Richard 
Prince is well-recognized among the art community as an appropriation art-
ist, and appropriation art is accepted by many in the art world as a form of 
art.264 Indeed, prominent museums, including the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Art Institute of Chicago, filed an 
amicus brief supporting Prince’s argument of fair use in the Cariou case.265 
By contrast, the recording industry and music publishers have not publicly 
embraced music appropriation as an accepted practice, notwithstanding the 
history of borrowing in music.266 Parody songs are one thing. But non-parody 
songs strike at the core of the music industry. Although artists do borrow from 
other works and some openly admit it, neither the recording nor publishing 
industry has openly embraced appropriation or borrowing in music, not even 
in the creation of new (potentially money-generating) songs.267 
Fair use in music could operate like a Pandora’s box to music appro-
priation because it might potentially allow greater copying than the test of 
infringement or de minimis doctrine. Indeed, the determination of the af-
firmative defense of fair use often follows a finding of infringement, and 
the de minimis doctrine, as its name implies, is meant to deal with trivial 
copying. By contrast, fair use has no hard-and-fast limit on the amount of 
copying. When a defendant’s use of a work is transformative, courts recog-
nize that fair use permits a defendant to copy an amount that is reasonable 
for the transformative use.268 
Of course, allowing greater music borrowing under the fair use doc-
trine may be, in the end, good for music creation and society. A court, how-
ever, might be more cautious about such a ruling if it feared disrupting the 
music industry in a significant way. 
4. Judicial Economy 
Fair use avoidance also may result in judicial economy. The alternative 
bases courts have used in music cases are more amenable to summary dispo-
sition than fair use, thereby reducing litigation and administrative costs.269  
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Take, for example, Guy Hobbs’s complaint against Elton John for al-
legedly copying Hobbs’s love song titled “Natasha.”270 Seeking a publisher, 
Hobbs had sent his work to Big Pig Music in 1983 but was unsuccessful in 
landing a publisher.271 Then, in 1985, Elton John and Bernard Taupin com-
posed a song “Nikita” that was published by the same Big Pig Music.272 
Hobbs sued John, Taupin, and Big Pig Music for copyright infringement 
based largely on similarities in the lyrics, as well as the theme of a doomed 
love story involving women named “Natasha” and “Nikita,” respectively.273 
The district court, however, dismissed the complaint upon a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a copyright claim, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.274 The Seventh Circuit held that the two works were not substantial-
ly similar.275 The court discounted the key similarities proffered by Hobbs, 
namely, that his song used the phrase “to hold you” three times and John’s 
song used the phrase four times; that Hobbs’s song used the phrase “you’ll 
never know” six times and John’s song used the same phrase three times; 
and that “Natasha” and “Nikita” were similar Russian-sounding female 
names.276 For a court to grant a motion to dismiss and to decide the case 
merely on the allegations, where some similarities in the two songs existed, 
is questionable. Yet the test of infringement has been interpreted by courts 
to afford such judicial economy.277 Although acknowledging the two songs 
had similar expression, the Seventh Circuit found the similarities were un-
protected and “rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or unavoidable in 
popular love songs.”278 
In the backdrop of the case is the question whether a successful artist 
like Elton John would have even been aware of Hobbs’s work in the first 
place. On the motion to dismiss, the court did not have an opportunity to 
consider evidence regarding Big Pig Music’s receipt of and possible use of 
Hobbs’s work.279 Under the Second Circuit’s substantial similarity test, set 
forth in its 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter, a defendant’s reasonable 
access to a work is circumstantial evidence of copying if probative similari-
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ties between the two works can be shown.280 Such access can be shown by 
evidence that an intermediary of the defendant’s had a copy of the work, so 
if Hobbs’s allegation of Big Pig Music’s receipt of his work was true, it 
might be enough, with further fact development, to establish a prima facie 
case that Elton John had access to the work.281 In some cases, the lack of 
sufficient allegation or evidence of access can provide a basis for a court to 
dispose of the case.282 But, here, the allegation might be sufficient to survive 
a motion to dismiss, so the court instead rested on the lack of substantial 
similarity between the two songs by holding that the key portions of 
Hobbs’s song allegedly copied were simply not copyrightable.283 
Of course, one might question whether fair use even fits Hobbs v. 
John. As discussed in Part III, where the case involves a well-known de-
fendant who is established in the music industry and an unestablished plain-
tiff, the facts may be such that the defendant never knew the plaintiff, much 
less his work.284 The fact scenario of an unestablished plaintiff suing an es-
tablished defendant does raise the possibility, if not worry, of a plaintiff 
seeking a deep pocket on a trumped-up claim. In such case, fair use simply 
does not fit.285 
We cannot automatically assume, however, that every case involving 
an unestablished plaintiff suing an established artist involves a trumped-up 
claim. Arguably, Hobbs presented a plausible basis in his allegations to sug-
gest his claim was not frivolous. Likewise, in the Seventh Circuit’s 2012 
case Peters v. West, Vince Peters, an aspiring hip-hop artist, alleged that the 
defendant, Kanye West, had access to Peters’s work “Stronger” through an 
intermediary of Kanye West.286 West eventually came out with a mega-hit 
“Stronger” that allegedly contained some of the same elements as in Pe-
ters’s “Stronger,” including the reference to Nietzsche’s quote “what does 
not kill me, makes me stronger;” use of the rhymes “longer” and “wronger” 
(a slang term); and a line in both songs expressing desire for a woman like 
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“Kate Moss.”287 The allegations of both access and copying do seem 
stronger (pun intended) than in the case against Elton John.288 But even on 
these allegations, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of the case for failure to state a copyright claim.289 
By contrast, fair use, as an affirmative defense often involving the 
need for discovery, is rarely decided on a motion to dismiss.290 As one court 
explained: 
It is easy to see why a fair use defense typically cannot be analyzed 
upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. “Fair use is a mixed question of law 
and fact.” . . . The court’s determination involves weighing at least 
four statutory factors, which usually requires making factual find-
ings or relying on undisputed or admitted material facts.291 
Although one might disagree with the courts’ dismissals in Peters and Hobbs 
before discovery, they do exemplify how courts can use the test of substantial 
similarity to dispose of music cases on a motion to dismiss.292 Fair use would 
not typically afford courts such a possibility, early in the litigation.  
B. Disadvantages 
Fair use avoidance has its disadvantages as well. Of greatest concern is 
the possible harm the lack of clear precedent recognizing non-parody music 
fair use has on the creation of music. 
1. Possible Chilling Effect 
It is hard to quantify what, if any, effect the lack of a clear precedent 
has on a particular activity or industry. Lack of a clear fair use precedent 
can cut both ways, given the uncertainty in what the law actually is. Some 
artists may take advantage of the lack of a clear precedent, viewing it as a 
blank check or at least a gray area to borrow other music in the creation of 
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their own, especially if such borrowing is a widespread practice among oth-
er artists.293 To take an extreme example of borrowing, Girl Talk, who sam-
ples, manipulates, and mashes up other artists’ recordings into his songs, 
presumably operates under the general authority of fair use.294 So far, Girl 
Talk has not been sued for copyright infringement.295 
By contrast, the lack of a clear fair use precedent in music might chill 
other artists from borrowing or building on the works of others. Independ-
ent and unestablished artists might be particularly susceptible to such a 
chilling effect out of fear of either being sued or not being accepted as a true 
artist in the music industry. To the extent a new artist like Sam Smith be-
comes successful with a hit song that is later accused of being plagiarized 
from an older song, the lack of a clear fair use precedent militates toward 
the artist’s conceding to a license and the payment of royalties to deal with 
claims of copyright infringement. 
In the appeal of the verdict against Pharrell and Thicke, 212 musicians 
and songwriters submitted an amici curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit ex-
pressing great concern about the decision and its possible effect on music.296 
The artists included members of successful bands including Train; Linkin 
Park; Earth, Wind & Fire; The Black Crowes; Three 6 Mafia; Great White; 
Poison; Fall Out Boy; Tool; The Go-Go’s; Weezer; and Tears for Fears, as 
well as individual artists R. Kelly; John Oates of Hall & Oates; Hans Zim-
mer; Jennifer Hudson; Jean Baptiste; Evan Bogart; and Danger Mouse.297 
According to the brief, Pharrell and Thicke’s song was a creation “inspired 
by” a prior work, which, the musicians argued, is how all music is created: 
Amici are concerned about the potential adverse impact on their 
own creativity, on the creativity of future artists, and on the music 
industry in general, if the judgment in this case is allowed to stand. 
The verdict in this case threatens to punish songwriters for creating 
new music that is inspired by prior works. All music shares inspira-
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tion from prior musical works, especially within a particular musi-
cal genre. By eliminating any meaningful standard for drawing the 
line between permissible inspiration and unlawful copying, the 
judgment is certain to stifle creativity and impede the creative pro-
cess. The law should provide clearer rules so that songwriters can 
know when the line is crossed, or at least where the line is.298 
The brief cites examples of famous artists—David Bowie, Lady Gaga, El-
ton John, The Beatles, Elvis Presley, and even Marvin Gaye—who were 
influenced by prior works in creating their own music.299 A clear decision 
on music fair use would provide greater guidance to songwriters on how 
much borrowing is permissible. Of course, Pharrell and Thicke chose not to 
assert fair use.300 But the lack of clear precedent on the issue may have con-
tributed to their litigation strategy. 
2. Copyright Clutter 
Another possible harm exacerbated, if not created, by the lack of a clear 
fair use precedent in music is what I will characterize as “copyright clutter.” 
The concept of “clutter” has been used in other areas of intellectual property, 
including patent301 and trademark,302 and thus is not unique to copyright. Ob-
taining a copyright for an original work is easy because it happens upon fixa-
tion of the work automatically, by operation of law.303 Given the relatively 
long term of copyright (e.g., life of the author plus seventy years), works da-
ting back to 1923 are still under copyright today.304 Many of these musical 
works have a limited commercial shelf life, both in terms of sales and public 
performances. Even the biggest hits of yesterday are not as popular as they 
once were. Because copyrights do not need to be registered or renewed by 
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payment of maintenance fees, many older works that are not being utilized or 
exploited are still protected by copyright. As a result, they have the potential 
to create “copyright clutter,” with many older musical works—including cer-
tain combinations of notes contained therein—becoming off-limits to song-
writers who might otherwise build upon those works if they operated under a 
clear, non-parody music fair use precedent. 
Copyright clutter might not have been a big concern in the past. Lach-
es used to be a defense against copyright claims that could have been 
brought long ago.305 But after 2014, when the Supreme Court, in Petrella v. 
Metro-Goldywn-Mayer, Inc., reversed lower court precedent that had recog-
nized laches as a defense to copyright claims,306 copyright clutter is now 
more real. There has already been a slight uptick in lawsuits involving older 
musical works, including Taurus’s lawsuit against Led Zeppelin for its 1971 
hit song “Stairway to Heaven.”307 Although Led Zeppelin was found not to 
have infringed, the band still had to fight the claim of copyright infringe-
ment at trial and any subsequent appeal.308 The Supreme Court’s laches de-
cision in Petrella has given new life to many lawsuits involving older musi-
cal works that were allegedly infringed by more recent music.309 As one 
commentator described, “[f]ederal courts were awash last year in copyright 
infringement lawsuits claiming popular songs stole key elements from ear-
lier tunes.310 Those targeted included the biggest names in contemporary 
music—Justin Bieber, Kanye West, Ed Sheeran—as well as musical leg-
ends, like Notorious B.I.G. and Eric Clapton.”311 
C. Overall Assessment 
A greater need exists today for a clear, non-parody music fair use rul-
ing as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music established for parodies. Although the music sector has survived and 
seemingly flourished without such a fair use ruling for many years, the re-
cent spate of music lawsuits following Petrella will likely test the limits of 
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the single-factor doctrines (for example, access, similarity, stock elements, 
de minimis doctrine) that courts have used in the past to resolve such dis-
putes.312 Even Bruno Mars’s smash hit “Uptown Funk,” which is one of 
only thirteen songs in history to earn the RIAA’s highest award of diamond 
status for sales of over 10 million copies, has been the subject of no fewer 
than three different copyright lawsuits: two by 1970s musicians the Gap 
Band and the Sequence, respectively, and one by 1980s musicians Zapp and 
Collage, all of whom allege that Bruno Mars and the other composers of 
“Uptown Funk” copied elements of the plaintiffs’ songs and committed in-
fringement.313 Regardless of the outcome of these lawsuits, it is striking that 
one of the top-selling songs in history written and performed by one of the 
top-selling artists in history is not immune from multiple allegations of pla-
giarism by artists from the 1970s and 1980s. It could be that Bruno Mars 
borrowed elements from prior songs as alleged in the lawsuits, but whether 
such borrowing constitutes infringement cannot be fully answered with 
consideration of fair use. Given the pervasiveness of borrowing in music 
among even the most successful and established artists in both modern and 
classical times, a clear precedent that recognizes that some borrowing of 
music to create another musical work is a fair use in some cases might 
strike the right chord for music creativity. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides the first comprehensive study of fair use in music 
cases. The result of the empirical study is puzzling. Despite the relatively 
high number of music cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act, no deci-
sion recognizes non-parody fair use of a musical work to create another mu-
sical work except a recent decision whose applicability is marginal because 
it only involved the copying of words of a rap that contained no accompa-
nying music. Few music cases have even considered a fair use defense. Alt-
hough this Article posited several hypotheses to explain this fair use avoid-
ance, it remains inconclusive whether the lack of a clear precedent recog-
nizing music fair use has harmed the creation of music. The potential prob-
lem of “copyright clutter,” however, and the resulting quarantine of note 
combinations from older, unutilized, and underutilized musical works may 
make the need for a clear fair use precedent more pressing today. 
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